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I. INTRODUCTION 
 
   “... detailed conditionality (often including dozens of conditions) has burdened IMF 
  programs in recent years and made such programs unwieldy, highly conflictive, 
  time consuming to negotiate, and often ineffectual.” 
 
   “The IMF should cease lending to countries for long-term development assistance 
   (as in sub-Saharan Africa) and for long-term structural transformation (as in  
   post-Communist transition economies)... The current practice of extending  
   long-term loans in exchange for member countries’ agreeing to conditions set 
   by the IMF should end.” 
Meltzer Report [2000, pp. 7,8, and 43] 
 
   “Both the Fund and the Bank have tried to do too much in recent years, and they 
   have lost sight of their respective strengths. They both need to return to basics... 
   [The Fund] should focus on a leaner agenda of monetary, fiscal, and exchange 
   rate policies, and of banking and financial-sector surveillance and reform.” 
Council on Foreign Relations Task Force Report [1999, p. 18-19] 
 
   “The one common theme that runs through perceptions of ESAF at the country 
   level is a feeling of a loss of control over the policy content and the pace of 
   implementation of reform programs.”
1 
External Evaluation of the ESAF [Botcheway et al, 1998, p. 20] 
 
   “The IMF should eschew the temptation to use currency crises as an opportunity 
   to force fundamental structural and institutional reforms on countries, however 
   useful they may be in the long term, unless they are absolutely necessary to 
   revive access to international funds.” 
Martin Feldstein [1998, p. 32] 
 
     “..the IMF’s activities are not related to those specified in its charter for the simple 
   reason that the par-value system of exchange rates it was to monitor no longer 
   exists. In the tradition of skilled bureaucracies, the IMF has turned to new 
   areas and has managed to expand substantially its financial resources and, 
   in the process, its influence.” 
George Shultz [1995, p.5] 
 
   “The IMF has not been established to give guidance on social and political 
   priorities, nor has its voting system been designed to give it the moral 
   authority to oversee priorities of a noneconomic nature. Its functions have 
   to be kept narrowly technical....and the Fund has to accept that the  
   authorities of a country are the sole judges of its social and political 
   priorities.” 
David Finch [1983, pp. 77-78]
2 
                                                 
1 ESAF is the Fund’s Enhanced Structural Adjustment Facility, established in 1987 to provide long-term 
concessional assistance to low-income countries facing protracted balance-of-payments problems.    3
 
   “... the IMF programs in East Asia are far from optimal for restoring financial market 
   confidence in the short term.... they have covered a very wide range of policies  
   beyond the immediate financial crisis.... Most of the structural reforms, however, 
   simply detract attention from the financial crisis. They have taken government 
   expertise, negotiating time, and political capital away from the core issues of 
   financial markets, exchange rate policy, and the like.” 
Steve Radelet and Jeff Sachs [1998, pp. 67-68] 
 
   “In view of the size of the current deficits and the difficulties that may arise in 
   private intermediation, the Fund must be prepared, when necessary, to lend in 
   larger amounts than in the past. Also, the structural problems faced by many 
   countries may require that adjustment take place over a longer period than has 
   been typical in the framework of Fund programs in the past.” 
IMF World Economic Outlook [1980] 
 
    
   “The Fund approach to adjustment has had severe economic costs for many of 
   these [developing] countries in terms of declines in the levels of output and growth 
   rates, reductions in employment and adverse effects on income distribution.” 
Report by the Group of Twenty-Four [1987, p. 9] 
    
 
   “Our prime objective is growth. In my view, there is no longer any ambiguity 
   about this. It is towards growth that our programs and their conditionality are aimed.”  
 
   “Only the pursuit of ‘high-quality’ growth is worth the effort. What is such  
   growth?  It is growth that can be sustained over time without causing domestic 
   and external financial imbalance; growth that has the human person at its center... 
   growth that, to be sustainable, is based on a continuous effort for more equity, 
   poverty alleviation, and empowerment of poor people; and growth that promotes 
   protection of the environment, and respect for national cultural values. This is 
   what our programs are, more and more, and must aim for.” 
 
From speeches by former IMF Managing Director, Michel Camdessus. 
 [1990, 2000a, respectively] 
 
   “In recent years, some critics of the IMF have gone to the opposite extreme, arguing 
   that the IFIs should have done more, especially in the context of the economies in 
   transition to develop an appropriate framework of property rights in support of  
   markets.... in considering the future of the two institutions, their activities need to be 
   geared to strengthening the private sector and the appropriate role of government in 
   relation to it.” 
Anne Krueger [1998, p. 2003] 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
2 Mr. Finch was then the Director of the IMF’s Exchange and Trade Relations Department   4
.  “I do not accept the view that when it comes to our poorer member countries, 
   we should not be lending to them, but should turn it over to someone else.... Is 
   the poverty reduction and growth facility ... which we are working on jointly with 
   the World Bank ... going to be an improvement in the way we deal with countries? 
   Absolutely. Why? Because ... it forces us, in cooperation with the World Bank, 
   to make sure that the macroeconomic framework is consistent with what needs 
   to be done for social reasons. Macroeconomic instability is bad for everyone 
   everywhere... That is why we should remain in these countries.... But we cannot 
   do that in a way that ignores the fact that poverty is the main problem confronting 
   these countries, and that there must be massive efforts, spearheaded by the World 
   Bank, to reduce poverty in these countries.” 
Stanley Fischer, IMF First Deputy Managing Director [2000a] 
 
   “A changed IMF is needed for the changed world we now have... As we look to 
   the future we need to redouble our efforts to find better approaches if not answers 
   to fundamental questions...How do we balance concerns about intrusiveness in 
   national affairs and a desire to promote national ownership of reform programs with 
   a desire to see governments take bolder steps to, for example, build stronger social 
   safety nets, implement core labor standards, empower civil society groups, reduce 
   the role of government in the economy, and address critical issues related to  
   governance, corruption, and crony capitalism?” 
U.S. Treasury Secretary Summers [1999]  
 
   “...the proposed eligibility criteria [for IMF lending in the Meltzer report] are 
   too narrow. Even where they are met, they would be unlikely to protect economies 
   from the broad range of potential causes of crises. The criteria focus on the  
   financial sector, and yet even problems that surface in the financial sector often 
   have their roots in deeper economic and structural weaknesses. One simply cannot 
   predict with confidence what the next generation of crises will be and therefore we 
   need to preserve the IMF’s ability to respond flexibly to changing circumstances.” 
U.S. Treasury Response to the Meltzer Report [2000a, p.17] 
 
   “A central part of the programs in the Asian crisis countries was an unprecedented 
   body of structural reforms...The overriding question is whether it was appropriate 
   to place so much emphasis on structural reform measures in the financial and  
   corporate sectors... The answer is clearly yes.”  
IMF Report (Lane et al. [1999]) on Fund Programs in Indonesia, Korea, and Thailand 
 
   “... the bottom line of the ‘era of the IFIs,’ despite obvious shortcomings, has been an 
   unambiguous success of historic proportions in both economic and social terms.” 
Minority Dissent, Meltzer Report (Bergsten et al. [2000, p. 111]) 
 
 
    5
  As suggested above, an active debate has long been underway -- and has intensified in 
the wake of the Asian crisis -- about the appropriate scope and intrusiveness of IMF 
policy conditionality. In this paper, I take up one key element of that debate, namely, the 
role of structural policies in IMF-supported adjustment programs. By “structural 
policies,” I mean policies aimed not at the management of aggregate demand but rather at 
either improving the efficiency of resource use and/or increasing the economy’s 
productive capacity. Structural policies are usually aimed at reducing/dismantling 
government-imposed distortions or putting in place various institutional features of a 
modern market economy. Such structural policies include, inter alia: financial-sector 
policies; liberalization of trade, capital markets, and of the exchange rate system; 
privatization and public enterprise policies; tax and expenditure policies (apart from the 
overall fiscal stance); labor market policies; pricing and marketing policies; transparency 
and disclosure policies; poverty-reduction and social safety-net policies; pension policies; 
corporate governance policies (including anti-corruption measures); and environmental 
policies. 
    To set the stage for what follows, it is worth summarizing the main concerns and 
criticisms that have been expressed about the IMF’s existing approach to structural policy 
conditionality.
3 These typically take one or more of the following forms. 
   First, there is a worry that wide-ranging and micro-managed structural policy 
recommendations will be viewed by developing-country borrowers as so costly and 
intrusive as to discourage unduly the demand for Fund assistance during crises.
4 Even 
                                                 
3 Neither these concerns and criticisms, nor the counter-arguments outlined later in this section, should be 
interpreted as my own views. I provide my own summary assessment of past Fund structural conditionality 
in Section VI. 
4 See, for example, Feldstein [1998].   6
though the cost of borrowing from the Fund (the so-called rate of charge) is much lower 
than the cost of borrowing from private creditors -- particularly during times of stress -- 
we observe that developing countries usually come to the Fund “late in the day” when 
their balance-of-payments problems are already severe.
5 This suggests that developing 
countries place a non-trivial shadow price on the policy conditions associated with Fund 
borrowing. The concern is that if these conditions become too onerous, emerging 
economies will wait even longer to come to the Fund (as Thailand did in 1997) and/or 
will turn to regional official crisis lenders that offer easier policy conditionality (e.g., in 
1998 Malaysia was one of the first beneficiaries of low-conditionality Miyazawa 
Initiative funds, and Asian countries could eventually decide to elevate the infant Chiang-
Mai swap arrangements into a full-fledged Asian Monetary Fund).
6 The outcome -- so the 
argument goes -- would then be even more difficult initial crisis conditions, greater resort 
to the anti-social behavior that the Fund was established to prevent, and a tendency 
toward Gresham’s Law of conditionality (where weak regional conditionality would 
drive out not only the unnecessary but also the necessary elements of Fund 
conditionality). 
   A second concern is that insistence on deep structural reforms in cases of illiquidity 
(rather than insolvency) will serve only to frighten private investors about the size of the 
problem, thereby rendering more difficult the restoration of confidence and the rollover 
of short-term capital flows that are the keys to resolving the liquidity crisis.
7 No country 
(including the G-7 countries) is without some structural weaknesses but it is argued that 
                                                 
5 The Fund’s rate of charge averaged about 4.5 percent in 1997-2000; in contrast, emerging-market bond 
spreads (relative to U.S. Treasuries) have fluctuated from 375 to 1700 basis points since the outbreak of the 
Thai crisis in mid-1997. 
6 See Bergsten [2000] on regional financial initiatives in Asia.   7
however desirable structural policy reforms may be for the performance of the economy 
over the longer term, it is a mistake to suggest that such reforms are indispensable to 
resolving the crisis (when they are not). Among the Asian crisis countries, Korea is 
identified as a case where solvency was never in question and where less emphasis on 
structural reform both in the diagnosis and the policy prescription would have produced a 
milder crisis. 
   Concern number three is with equal treatment of countries -- one of the Fund’s key 
operating principles. Here, the argument is that the Fund has been asking for sweeping 
structural reforms from developing countries that it would not ask of industrial countries 
were the latter in similar circumstances. As Paul Volcker put it, “When the Fund consults 
with a poor and weak country, the country gets in line. When it consults with a big and 
strong country, the Fund gets in line.”
8 While differences across countries in economic 
and political power are a fact of life, the argument is that requiring developing countries 
to undertake more structural remedies (than would their industrial-country counterparts) 
undermines local “ownership” of Fund programs.  It also works at cross-purposes from 
simultaneous efforts to forge a consensus on strengthening the international financial 
architecture in (mixed developing country/industrial-country) groups like the G-20 and 
the Financial Stability Forum. 
   Yet a fourth criticism is that permitting the Fund to stray from its core competence of 
macroeconomic and exchange rate policies into a host of structural policy areas results in 
poor crisis management, weakens the Fund’s overall reputation for competent analysis 
and advice (with adverse spillovers for the credibility of its recommendations in core 
                                                                                                                                                 
7 See Radelet and Sachs [1998]. 
8 Volcker and Gyohten [1992].   8
policy areas), and runs counter to a sensible division of labor and an application of 
comparative advantage among the various international financial institutions (IFIs). In 
this connection, critics have maintained: that the Fund bungled bank closures in 
Indonesia and precipitated a credit crunch in the crisis countries by requiring an unduly 
rapid increase in bank capitalization;
9 that the Fund lacks both the expertise and staff 
resources to make timely and sound policy recommendations in areas as diverse as 
corporate governance, trade policy, privatization, poverty reduction, and environmental 
management; and that “mission creep” on the part of both the Fund and the Bank, cum a 
blurring of responsibilities between them, reduces the public and legislative support 
necessary to fund them adequately.
10 Long-term structural reforms (at least outside the 
financial sector) and poverty reduction should be the main business of the World Bank -- 
not of the Fund. 
   A fifth charge is that the way the Fund has been managing its structural policy 
conditionality is flawed. Specifically, the argument is that multiplication of structural 
performance conditions, the specification of “micro” policy measures, and the increasing 
reliance on (qualitative) structural benchmarks and program reviews (as monitors of 
policy performance) have combined both to increase the uncertainty facing Fund 
borrowers and to lower the incentive to follow through with structural reform. 
Performance criteria were instituted not only to assure the Fund that its financial 
resources were being used for the purposes intended but also to assure the borrowing 
country that if it undertook certain pre-specified policy actions it would be eligible to 
                                                 
9   See, for example, Stiglitz [1999]. 
10  See Council on Foreign Relations [1999].   9
draw.
11  Also, because performance criteria were relatively few in number, easily 
measured, and macro in their impact, they both conveyed a relatively clear message about 
which policy actions were deemed (by the Fund) to carry the highest priority and 
provided a fairly predictable link with bottom-line economic outcomes (e.g., 
improvement in the balance of payments). But when a Fund program contains say, on the 
order of 50 or more qualitative structural policy conditions, when many of these 
conditions are very micro in nature, and when both fulfillment of these conditions and 
eligibility to draw require judgmental calls by the Fund, signals, impacts, and incentives 
will be more muddled. Should meeting 30 of 50 structural policy conditions be 
interpreted as a “good overall effort” that merits Fund support, or should it be viewed as a 
significant non-compliance with the program?  
   Suffice to say that these criticisms of the Fund’s structural policy conditionality have 
not gone unchallenged. Again, in the spirit of motivating the subsequent discussion, it is 
well to consider the following counter-arguments. 
   Although the structural policy conditions the Fund attaches to its loans are often 
demanding and threaten vested interests within the country, emerging economies 
recognize that a Fund program represents their best chance to make real traction on the 
structural weaknesses that have underpinned their crisis vulnerability. Private capital 
markets, while they sometimes supply strong disciplining force, are not perfect 
substitutes for either the Fund’s specific policy advice or its financing; indeed, in more 
than a few cases, private creditors will not extend credit in large amounts until the Fund 
                                                 
11 See Guitian [1981] and Polak [1991].   10
has blessed a country’s policies.
12 Turning the steering wheel over temporarily to an 
outside party is always costly but better the Fund than one or two large G-7 countries. 
Ironically, the structural policy measures that have drawn the most critical fire in several 
of the Asian crisis countries (Indonesia and Korea) were for a long time high on the 
priority list of domestic reformers, but they could not get those reforms implemented 
(over the opposition of the ruling elite) in a non-crisis situation.
13 At this point, there is no 
plan to turn Asian swap or credit arrangements into a serious rival to the Fund, at least 
with respect to offering large bail-outs under competing policy conditionality. Also, very 
few crisis countries (in Asia or elsewhere) have seen capital controls as the preferred 
mode of crisis management. Just as it’s not optimal for a host country to establish the 
weakest regulatory and prudential regime simply because it gives market participants the 
most freedom of action, it is not optimal (from the viewpoint of developing countries) to 
make Fund structural policy conditionality too easy or flexible. Fund “gaitsu” -- warts 
and all -- may still the best option out there for jump-starting structural reform. 
   The distinction between illiquidity and insolvency is not regarded as particularly 
helpful in most crisis situations since the dividing line between the two often rests on the 
quality of crisis management, and since countries differ from firms both in the nature of 
the relevant collateral and in their willingness (as opposed to ability) to pay.
14 While 
investor panic was an important part of the Asian crisis story, so too were “bad 
                                                 
12 Fischer [2000a, p. 1] argues that the fundamental reason why one needs an institution like the IMF is that 
“... the international financial system left to itself does not work perfectly, and it is possible to make it work 
better for the sake of the people who live in that system.” Also, see Masson and Mussa [1995] and Krueger 
[1998]. Rodrik [1995] notes that an experiment in which private creditors attempted to specify and monitor 
conditionality in Peru was soon discontinued.  
13 See Haggard [2000]. On the role of domestic reformers in the Asian crisis countries, he concludes as 
follows: “...it is misguided to see the course of policy solely as a response to external political pressures 
from the international financial institutions and the United States... At least in some important policy areas, 
domestic groups were reaching surprisingly similar conclusions on the need for reform.” (p. 12).   11
fundamentals” that increased downside risk. For example, in the run-up to the Korean 
crisis: 7 of the 30 largest chaebol were essentially bankrupt; there were large terms of 
trade losses in 1996 (especially for semi-conductors); non-performing loans in the 
banking system and leverage in the corporate sector were already high; there was a low 
return on invested capital; capital inflows were biased toward short-term capital and 
against foreign direct investment; there was a lack of transparency (including on the 
country’s short-term foreign liabilities); and substantial political uncertainty exacerbated 
the government’s credibility problem.
15 Yes, many of these structural problems were long 
standing and despite them, Korea had shown impressive growth performance over several 
decades. And yes, Korea has staged an impressive V-shaped recovery without 
eliminating all these structural problems. Nevertheless, it does not follow that Korea 
could have regained market confidence without making a good “start” on structural 
reform in 1997-98. Fund financing cum debt rescheduling and an (eventual) turn to easier 
monetary and fiscal policies -- without any structural policy reform -- would not have 
turned the situation around. Treating only the symptoms and not the (structural) root 
cause of the problem is not the way to restore confidence. Looking at pre-crisis fiscal 
positions in the crisis countries without considering the contingent government liabilities 
associated with financial-sector restructuring provides a misleading picture of 
fundamentals.
16 And the alleged negative effect of Fund public pronouncements on 
market confidence is said to be much exaggerated. Once Thailand’s fall “woke up” 
                                                                                                                                                 
14 See Fischer [1999]. 
15 See Roubini’s comments in McHale [2000b]. Claessens et al. [1999] also found that (pre-crisis) the four 
countries most seriously affected by the Asian crisis ranked low on the quality of the regulatory 
environment in an international comparison of middle-income emerging economies in East Asia and Latin 
America. 
16 See Boorman et al. [1999].   12
market participants to the poor health of banks and corporates in the rest of Asia and 
every large G-10 bank and security house in the region was issuing weekly reports on the 
rising share of non-performing loans in Asian financial systems, it is very unlikely that a 
Fund statement claiming it was only a short-term liquidity crisis would have turned the 
tide (after all, the Fund’s then Managing Director was already telling all who would listen 
that the crisis was really “a blessing in disguise”).
17   
   Reflecting, inter alia, their less preferred access (in terms of maturity, currency, and 
predictability) to international capital markets, their weaker institutional framework 
(ranging from judicial systems to insolvency regimes), and their track record of higher 
political instability, developing countries are different from industrial countries. 
Recognizing this difference is not unequal treatment but seeing the world as it is. If the 
Asian crisis countries -- despite their impressive performance on economic growth, 
inflation, and macro-fundamentals over a long period -- were regarded by private 
financial markets as just like industrial countries, they could have “done an Australia” 
and got out of the crisis by lowering interest rates and letting their exchange rates 
depreciate moderately -- and this without any Fund assistance.
18 In the event, they could 
not do that. Nor will the crisis countries be able to sustain their recoveries if they lapse 
back into the same structural weaknesses they had before. As such, it is not realistic to 
expect a developing country that gets into a crisis to live by the same structural policy 
conditionality as would a troubled industrial country.
19 For the foreseeable future, 
                                                 
17 See Goldstein [1998] and Ahluwalia [2000] on the “wake up” hypothesis as an explanation of the 
contagion in the Asian crisis. 
18 See Krugman [1998] on what the “confidence game” means for monetary and fiscal policies in 
developing countries during a crisis versus what is asked from industrial countries. 
19 See Eichengreen and Hausman [2000] on financing differences between developing countries and 
industrial countries.    13
developing countries will have to contend with a history of banking, debt, and currency 
crises, and restoration of confidence will often require a different dose and mix of 
macroeconomic and structural policies than would be the case for industrial countries. 
There is no indication that disagreement over past Fund structural policy conditionality is 
hampering the work of groups like the G-20 and the FSF; quite the contrary, those groups 
are making real progress in areas like the application of international financial standards.  
   The Fund has developed considerable expertise in dealing with banking and financial-
sector problems in developing countries. Over the past five years, more than 45 
specialists (including former bank supervisors) have been added to the staff of the Fund’s 
Monetary and Exchange Affairs Department alone. Admittedly, bank closures in 
Indonesia did not go well. But since deposit insurance arrangements were not in place, 
since the authorities were willing to close only a small share of the insolvent banks, and 
since there were concerns about the moral hazard effects of a blanket guarantee, there 
was no easy alternative to that action.
20  Likewise, if stricter bank capitalization 
requirements had not been instituted in the crisis countries, we would have seen rampant 
“double or nothing” lending behavior by insolvent lenders and an even higher fiscal bill 
for the bank clean-up. Evidence on the existence of a credit crunch in the crisis countries 
in 1997-98 is far from clear cut.
21 
   In areas outside the Fund’s comparative advantage, the Fund draws heavily on other 
IFIs with the requisite expertise -- and especially on the World Bank. This collaboration 
is particularly close on poverty reduction and social safety net issues but also applies 
increasingly to corporate governance, privatization, trade policy, and environmental 
                                                 
20 See Lindgren et al. [1999]. 
21 See Lane et al. [1999].   14
impacts. Eliminating all overlap between the Fund and the Bank (on fiscal and banking 
reform) is neither feasible nor desirable. The Fund’s major focus in the poor countries 
remains on the macroeconomic framework -- a specialization which no other IFI is as 
qualified to handle. A merger of the Fund and the Bank is unappealing -- both because it 
would sacrifice the speed and efficiency that comes with still a rather small IMF, and 
because a mega-IFI would have too much power across a wide spectrum of macro and 
microeconomic issues. 
   Yes, the Fund has given increased emphasis in recent years to economic growth and to 
social conditions in the design and implementation of its programs with developing 
countries -- just as it was responsive to the unique opportunity and massive need for 
institution building systems in the fledging market economies and new democracies of 
Eastern Europe. The world has changed. If the Fund did not change with it and if the 
Fund did not embrace the same objectives in its programs as its members pursue in their 
national economic policies, there would be little chance that Fund programs would be 
either agreed or implemented.
22 
   Structural policies are not like macroeconomic policies and indicators of policy 
compliance have to reflect those differences. You can’t measure progress on banking 
supervision or privatization the same way you track net domestic credit or international 
reserves. Performance benchmarks for structural policies have to be qualitative and a 
measure of discretion is needed to evaluate the results. Also, because of the 
interdependencies among structural policies, a macroeconomic impact will come only if 
progress is made on many fronts simultaneously. Furthermore, the devil is in the details. 
It makes a big difference if the borrowing country responds to a Fund condition for a   15
large cut in the budget deficit by slashing expenditure on health and education versus the 
curtailment of the national car project. And because both the implementation of and pay-
off from structural projects take longer than macroeconomic and exchange rate policies, 
it is necessary to measure progress along the way. All of this produces many detailed 
structural performance tests and some uncertainty about whether the overall effort will 
warrant Fund financial support, but there are no shortcuts that would work better.       
   The rest of the paper elaborates on these issues and sets out some additional arguments 
and factual material relevant for gauging what IMF structural policy conditionality 
should be like in the future. In Section II, I ask what if any guidance on structural policy 
involvement can be gleaned from the Fund’s charter and/or guidance notes from its 
Executive Board. I then discuss three alternative mandates for Fund lending within which 
structural policy conditionality might operate -- ranging from a narrow one based on 
correction of balance-of-payments problems and resolution of the current crisis, to 
broader ones that add avoidance of future crises and pursuit of “high quality” economic 
growth to the agenda. Section III looks at various dimensions of Fund structural policy 
involvement and conditionality -- both in the Asian crisis countries over the past three 
years and more broadly over the past several decades. It also offers some tentative 
conclusions on the effectiveness of that conditionality, with particular emphasis on the 
compliance with Fund conditionality. Because very little factual material has been 
published heretofore on Fund structural policy conditionality, Section III contains a 
number of tables and charts documenting the patterns in such conditionality. In Section 
IV, I speculate on why the scope and micro-management of Fund structural policy 
conditionality have increased in recent years. Section V lays out a set of potential 
                                                                                                                                                 
22 See Camdessus [1999b].   16
approaches to streamlining Fund structural policy conditionality. Finally, Section VI 
provides some brief concluding remarks that summarize my own views on Fund 
structural policy conditionality. A postscript summarizes the findings of a group of very 
recent Fund reports on conditionality -- including one (IMF [2001c]) with an expanded 
data base on Fund structural conditions -- that appeared after (the body of ) this paper was 
written.  
 
II. STRUCTURAL POLICIES AND THE MANDATE OF THE IMF 
A. Scripture and Field Manuals 
One starting point for figuring out how involved the Fund should be in structural policies 
would be to look at the Fund’s basic marching orders. These range from the IMF’s 
charter (called the “Articles of Agreement”) to specific guidance notes issued by the 
Fund’s Executive Board to Fund staff.  
   Table 1 reproduces (from Article I of the Articles of Agreement) the Fund’s purposes. 
While amendments have been made to other parts of the charter over the past fifty five 
years, not so with the purposes. Two things are immediately obvious from even a casual 
reading. There are many purposes --not just one; and there are a number of terms and 
concepts -- such as “confidence,” “national and international prosperity,” “temporary,” 
and “exchange system”-- that are (and indeed, have been) susceptible to multiple 
interpretations. 
   It is clear (at least to me) that a primary objective is not only to correct balance-of- 
payments disequilibria but also to do so in a particular way, that is, in a way that doesn’t 
involve either excessive deflation/unemployment at home or beggar-thy-neighbor   17
policies. This is how I interpret the phrases:  (in paragraph 5) “... without resorting to 
measures destructive of national and international prosperity;” and (in paragraph 3) “... to 
avoid competitive exchange depreciation.” Such an interpretation is of course also 
consistent with the Fund’s establishment as a response to the beggar-thy-neighbor and 
Great Depression problems of the 1920s and 1930s.   
   There is also clear support for measures that promote openness to international trade 
and a multilateral system of payments, and opposition to measures that hamper this 
openness. Capital movements are not mentioned. Again, this is consistent with the 
perceived (trade/output vicious circle) lessons of the 1920s and 1930s, and with the then 
popular view about the perils of destabilizing capital flows.  
  While there is no denying that a key task of the Fund at the time of its creation was to 
oversee a system of fixed but adjustable exchange rates, I interpret the promotion of 
“exchange stability” (in paragraph 3) as going beyond any particular form of exchange 
arrangements (be it adjustable pegs, currency boards, floating rates, etc).  Put another 
way, I don’t see the raison d’être of the Fund as having disappeared in the early 1970s 
along with the arrival of floating exchange rates. If the intention were otherwise, 
paragraph 3 would presumably have referred to “exchange rate” stability, and there 
would be no purposes other than that one.  
  Although Article I makes it plain that the framers regarded “... high levels of 
employment and income” and “...development of productive resources” as good things, it 
doesn’t say that the Fund should pursue those objectives by whatever means available. 
Instead, they specify that the Fund should facilitate “... the expansion and balanced   18
growth of international trade” and “contribute thereby” to buoyant domestic economic 
activity.  
   Where else might one look in the Fund’s charter for advice relevant to structural policy 
conditionality? Many would say the revised (in 1976) Article IV, which deals with 
general obligations of member countries and with the Fund’s surveillance 
responsibilities. Here, economic growth, and to a lesser extent, international capital 
movements, get greater play (than in the Fund’s purposes). Specifically, the new Article 
IV recognizes specifically that the essential purpose of the international monetary system 
is to provide a framework that both “... facilitates the exchange of goods, services, and 
capital among countries, and that sustains sound economic growth.” More noteworthy, 
member countries assume the general obligation to “... endeavor to direct ... economic 
and financial policies toward the objective of fostering orderly economic growth with 
reasonable price stability,” and the Fund assumes the obligation to oversee the 
“compliance” of each member country with this obligation.  
   Since “economic and financial policies” directed toward orderly economic growth 
potentially covers a lot of ground, the practical upshot of the revised Article IV was that 
it gave the Fund a much broader license to conduct wide-ranging surveillance and annual 
consultations with members. Ever since then, the Fund’s Article IV consultation reports 
have covered a host of policy areas, including many that would be designated as 
structural policies.
23 Even though Article IV carries the title, “Obligations Regarding 
Exchange Arrangements,” it embodied the view that you had to look at the underlying 
domestic policy determinants of a stable exchange rate system to see if countries were 
                                                 
23 For a review and analysis of the content of Fund surveillance, see Crow et al. 
 [1999].   19
meeting their international obligations.
24 Yes, Article IV is about Fund surveillance -- not 
about Fund policy conditionality. But the fact that the former has been given much wider 
scope (since at least the mid-1970s) probably has contributed somewhat to a wider field 
of view in Fund lending arrangements as well (more on that in Section IV).      
   But what about more specific directives relating to performance criteria agreed and 
issued by the Fund’s Executive Board. In my view, the most relevant document is 
probably the conditionality guidelines for stand-by arrangements, issued in 1979; see 
Table 2. To make a long story short, while the guidelines permits the number and content 
of performance criteria to vary with a country’s problems and institutional arrangements, 
guideline 9 specifies, inter alia, that performance criteria will “...normally be confined to 
macroeconomic variables,” and that “performance criteria may relate to other variables 
only in exceptional cases when they are essential for the effectiveness of the member’s 
program because of their macroeconomic impact.” My interpretation of all this is that, at 
least in Fund standby arrangements, the intention was to limit the number of structural-
policy performance criteria and to avoid “micro” conditionality (that is, measures that 
don’t have macroeconomic impact). While these guidelines have been revisited many 
times during later Board reviews of conditionality, they have been repeatedly endorsed. 
   But one must also take note that a variety of other lending arrangements (besides 
standbys) has been created in the Fund with the support of the membership over the past 
thirty years (ranging from a facility to assist transition economies cope with the shift 
away from state trading to multilateral market-based trading, to one that was to assist 
countries experiencing liquidity problems related to Y2K ). More to the point of this 
                                                 
24 Eichengreen [1999] has made a similar argument that the Fund can’t expect to be successful at promoting 
international financial stability without addressing sources of financial instability at the national level.   20
paper, some of those lending windows are directly aimed at protracted balance-of-
payments problems and at supporting comprehensive efforts at macroeconomic and 
structural reform. These include the Extended Fund Facility (EFF, established in 1974), 
and both the Structural Adjustment Facility (SAF, established in 1986) and Enhanced 
Structural Adjustment Facility (ESAF, established in 1987); eligibility for both the SAF 
and the ESAF is restricted to low-income countries.
25 For these lending windows, 
structural policy involvement is at the heart of the exercise and there is little guidance on 
how many or what kinds of structural policy measures would be viewed as “out of 
bounds.”  
  Given the prominence of governance issues in the Asian crisis, a final guidance note 
worth noting is the one issued in July 1997 by the Fund’s Executive Board on “The Role 
of the IMF in Governance Issues.” While the note states right at the beginning that “... the 
responsibility for governance issues lies first and foremost with the national authorities..,” 
it seems to give the Fund staff quite wide berth to include governance and corruption 
measures in Fund conditionality if they can make the case that governance problems have 
some direct macroeconomic impact. In addition, while the note urges the Fund staff to 
rely on other institutions’ expertise in areas of their purview, it states that the Fund could 
nevertheless recommend conditionality in those areas (outside the Fund’s expertise) if the 
staff considered that such measures were “.... critical to the successful implementation of 
the program.” Given the timing and context of this guidance note (just at the outset of the 
Asian crisis), some Fund staff have expressed the view (to me) that the Fund’s Board was 
sending them a signal that they would henceforth not support programs that ignored 
serious and widespread governance and corruption problems.    
                                                 
25 In 1999, the ESAF was reorganized into the Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility (PRGF).    21
   To sum up, the Fund’s existing marching orders on structural policy conditionality are 
Janus-faced enough so that both supporters of narrow conditionality and those of more 
comprehensive conditionality can find their own biblical passages to buttress their 
arguments. On the one side, I don’t see in the Fund’s charter a broad agenda aimed at 
high quality growth. What I see instead is a focus on balance-of-payments adjustment, 
trade opening, elimination of payments restrictions, efforts to increase stability of the 
exchange rate system, and a directive to avoid modes of external adjustment that make 
recession/deflation deeper than necessary and that impose undue costs on other 
countries.
26 This is not to deny that the Fund’s membership may want to pursue high-
quality growth (and poverty reduction) for a variety of reasons, including moral 
imperatives. It’s just that I can’t find that commandment on the original stone tablets. In a 
similar vein, the Fund’s conditionality guidelines for standby arrangements appear to 
have had the intention of limiting the number of structural performance criteria, 
particularly if they are micro in nature. On the other side of the ledger, the Fund’s overall 
surveillance responsibilities (under the revised Article IV) are quite wide ranging as 
regards structural policies, a succession of specific lending windows has been established 
over the past 25 years or so with an explicit structural policy orientation, and guidance 
notes on “new” structural policy issues like governance and corruption give the Fund 
staff considerable leeway to include such measures in conditionality so long as they can 
make a case that they are critical to the success of the program. Perhaps more telling, I 
could find no evidence of concern about the scope or intrusiveness of structural policy 
conditionality in the published summaries (so-called Public Information Notices, or 
                                                 
26 It’s also relevant to note that, unlike the charter of the EBRD, the Fund’s charter says nothing about 
promoting “democracy;” see Polak [1991] for a discussion of political influences on Fund lending.   22
PINs) of Executive Board meetings on the Thai, Indonesian, and Korean programs over 
the past three years -- even though the number and detail of structural conditions in those 
three programs are extraordinary (see Section III below). 
 
B. Three Alternative Mandates 
If there is relatively little guidance available about the appropriate intrusiveness of Fund 
structural policy conditionality from official sources, one might consider what different 
mandates for the Fund would imply about such conditionality. Here, I consider three 
possibilities, starting with the narrowest and ending with the broadest (and most 
ambitious).   
   (a) Mandate I: the Fund’s primary focus would be on macroeconomic and financial 
stability; its crisis management guideline would be to assist a country to get out of the 
current crisis as soon as possible (without imposing undue costs on itself or its 
neighbors). 
   An announced IMF focus on macroeconomic and financial stability would be similar to 
the increasing popular practice of national central bank announcing that their primary 
objective is price stability. It doesn’t preclude giving some consideration to other 
objectives but it makes clear which objective is king and where the authority’s central 
responsibility lies. The emphasis on getting out of the current crisis would mean that 
crisis management/resolution -- and not crisis prevention -- should guide program design. 
Crisis-prevention measures would presumably then be handled by the country on its own 
after the current crisis is resolved.   23
   Would Mandate I preclude Fund structural policy conditionality during a crisis? The 
answer, I believe, is no. But the extent of the structural conditions would be limited to 
measures directly related to resolution of the current crisis and their form would depend 
both on the nature of the crisis and the institutional structure in place in the crisis country; 
in addition, the design of essential structural policy conditions outside the Fund’s core 
competence (monetary, fiscal, exchange rate, and financial sector policies) would need to 
be handled by other IFIs. A few examples should suffice to illustrate the point. 
   Suppose that key contributory factors to a balance-of-payments crisis were an 
overvalued exchange rate and overly expansionary monetary and fiscal policies. Also 
assume that correction of relative prices was being thwarted by widespread indexation 
agreements in wage contracts.  Assume that the alternatives to devaluation as an 
adjustment tool are a more draconian tightening of monetary or fiscal policy (that would 
drive the domestic economy into deep recession) and/or a large hike in tariff and non-
tariff barriers.  In that case, reduction or elimination of those indexation provisions could 
be regarded as “essential” to external adjustment (without either excessive deflation or 
beggar-thy-neighbor effects ) and a labor-market performance test could be part of 
conditionality.
27   
   Next consider a case where the primary source of the external disequilibrium is a large 
budget deficit. Assume that the necessary fiscal adjustment needs to be large, that the 
economy is expected to undergo a serious contraction, that the incumbent government is 
quite unpopular at home (because there is a long history of cronyism and corruption), and 
that there is no social safety net to speak of. In that situation, it could be argued that the   24
Fund program needs to contain a few structural measures (e.g., the closing of a 
government cartel or monopoly) to send a visible signal to the public that some patronage 
is being taken away from well-connected government cronies and therefore that the 
program will be “even-handed” -- and this even if the structural measures themselves 
have no macroeconomic impact and lie outside the Fund’s core competence.
28 Here, these 
structural measures might be defended as necessary to establish “confidence.” Similarly, 
the creation of an unemployment insurance scheme or some other form of social safety 
net could be viewed as necessary to sustain popular support for the fiscal correction effort 
over the one or two-year program period.     
   Next, picture a situation where there is a banking crisis underway without a deposit 
insurance system in place. Depositors are withdrawing deposits from a group of weak 
banks and the government is supporting the weak banks’ ability to meet withdrawals by 
providing liquidity assistance to those banks. The deposit run is spreading and the 
liquidity injections are pumping up the monetary aggregates and driving down the 
exchange rate. It is also known that substantial funds will soon be needed to recapitalize 
insolvent banks and to increase capital at solvent but still weak banks. Because its debt 
burden is already high, the government cannot fund all the bank clean-up costs on its 
own. It will need help from private creditors abroad. Here too, one could defend 
structural conditions relating to bank closures and/or to deposit insurance reform as 
essential for resolving the current crisis; without them, the authorities will not be able to 
                                                                                                                                                 
27 Another example where labor market policies could be considered essential to overcoming the current 
crisis is when a banking crisis cannot be overcome without financial-sector and corporate restructuring, and 
the latter cannot be accomplished without revision of restrictive laws governing employee layoffs. 
28 Allen [1993, p. 18] takes such a view: “Structural policies can also help build and maintain the political 
consensus that will support macroeconomic stabilization -- for example, by combating unproductive and 
politically unpopular rent-seeking activities.”   25
control monetary policy and to halt the free fall of the currency. If the immediate aim of 
raising funds from abroad is being hampered by restrictions on capital inflows and/or by 
poor disclosure that prevents foreign creditors from judging the worth of domestic banks, 
removal/correction of restrictions/disclosure practices too might be defended as 
legitimate elements in conditionality. 
     In contrast to the above scenarios, consider a crisis situation brought on say, by a large 
terms-of-trade shock or a shift in investor sentiment stemming from contagion in a 
neighboring country. Assume also that there are many structural policy weaknesses and 
institutional gaps but that these are not serious enough or linked closely enough to 
monetary, fiscal, and exchange rate policies to prevent the crisis from being resolved with 
traditional macroeconomic instruments plus some Fund financing. Here, however 
desirable structural measures may be for longer-term performance, they would not be 
included as conditions for the program. A plain vanilla Fund program will do the job. 
  Another relevant question is whether Mandate I would still permit the Fund to make a 
contribution to poverty reduction in poor countries. The answer is yes, but only in so far 
as macroeconomic and financial stability itself contributes to poverty reduction, or 
because the Fund (in collaboration with the Bank) sees the incorporation of social safety 
nets into crisis resolution programs as necessary for the successful implementation of 
those programs. Longer-term efforts (outside of crises) to fight poverty would then be 
handled by the Bank and the regional development banks. 
   (b) Mandate II: the Fund’s primary focus would be (as in I) on macroeconomic and  
financial stability: its crisis guideline would be to assist a country not only to get out of 
the current crisis but to minimize the chances of getting into another one down the road.   26
   While the Fund’s core competence remains the same in Mandate II as in I, the big 
difference is that the Fund now incorporates crisis prevention as well as crisis resolution 
in program design. An implicit judgement here is that the country needs to use the crisis 
as a mechanism to reduce its crisis vulnerability and that it would not be able to do this 
on its own (i.e., without a Fund program) after the current crisis is resolved. Better then to 
“make hay while the sun shines” and combine crisis resolution and crisis prevention in 
the current program. If confidence in the crisis economy is very low, the Fund might also 
argue that investors will not return unless there is evidence that the probability of another 
(near-term) crisis is low; this in turn requires proof that the old (crisis-prone) “system” is 
changing and structural reform would be part and parcel of such proof. 
   Mandate II increases substantially the scope for structural policy conditionality -- even 
without going into non-core areas of economic policy. Again, a few examples convey the 
flavor. 
   Assume that the country has a long-standing problem of undisciplined monetary policy 
and that monetary policy excesses are also a key factor in the current crisis. In that case, 
the Fund might argue that a performance criterion that simply says that monetary policy 
will be tightened within the existing regime will not be credible. In this situation, the 
program might contain structural policy conditionality that either specifies granting 
independence to the central bank or that takes the monetary reins out of the central bank’s 
hands by establishing a currency board or single currency. 
   One could tell a similar story about long-standing weaknesses in fiscal policy that lead 
a country to accumulate a very heavy external debt burden. When say, a large, negative 
shock occurs to the terms of trade (e.g., oil prices fall), foreign investors run for the exits   27
and a debt crisis breaks out. Assume that the chronically weak fiscal position owes much 
to a narrow tax base, to a host of large loss-making public enterprises, and to the absence 
of a proper expenditure-control and budgeting departments in the Ministry of Finance. In 
parallel with the immediately-preceding example, the Fund might argue that a 
performance criterion that simply targets a lower fiscal deficit for the next year will not 
be credible. As such, the Fund program could contain structural conditions for widening 
the tax base, for privatizing state enterprises, and for establishing new administrative 
units in the Ministry of Finance.  
   Carrying forward the same theme, imagine a banking crisis whose proximate 
determinants are a sharp contraction of economic activity and/or a sharp rise in interest 
rates connected with a defense of a fixed exchange rate. But assume also that there was a 
large backlog of non-performing loans brought on by: state-owned banks that lent 
without any regard to creditworthiness of borrowers; commercial banks that had long 
demonstrated a proclivity toward “connected lending;” lax loan classification procedures 
that encouraged the “evergreening” of bad loans and that grossly overstated the true value 
of bank capital; a legal framework that made it difficult for banks to seize collateral from 
bankrupt borrowers; lack of effective banking supervision from a bank supervisory 
agency that had neither the political independence nor the mandate or resources to do its 
job; and lender moral-hazard, stoked by repeated episodes of bailing out bank depositors 
and creditors. Against such a background, the Fund might maintain that a program that 
merely specified closing insolvent banks and recapitalizing others to international 
standards would amount to flushing money down the drain. Even if the   
the current banking crisis were resolved, it wouldn’t be long before the same underlying   28
vulnerabilities produced a repetition (thereby exacerbating the problem of “prolonged 
use” of Fund resources).  Better then -- so the argument would go -- to require structural 
policy conditions that would change each of these poor banking and supervisory 
practices.    
   The same kind of argument could be made about the need for conditions (on bank bail-
outs and the like) to control “moral hazard” problems, which, by definition, relate to the 
effect of inappropriately-priced insurance arrangements (extended this period) on the 
risk-taking behavior of policyholders next period. Put in other words, it is precisely the 
worry about avoiding the next crisis that makes it necessary to put additional conditions 
on how you manage the current crisis.  
   (c) Mandate III: the Fund’s focus would be on macroeconomic and financial stability 
and on sustainable growth; its crisis guideline would be to assist the country not only to 
get out of the current crisis and to reduce its crisis vulnerability but also to put in place 
the conditions for sustainable high-quality growth. The difference here with respect to 
Mandates I and II is that “high quality” growth now occupies a more central role both in 
the Fund’s overall mandate and in its crisis-fighting strategy. Under this more holistic 
approach, conditionality would likely encompass measures that are viewed as necessary 
to improve economic growth and protect the poor and the vulnerable, as well as measures 
to improve the country’s resilience to future crises. A hypothetical country scenario can 
again help to illustrate the differences involved. 
   Consider a country that is suffering from persistently weak economic growth, a chronic 
budget deficit, a weak external position, pervasive state intervention, heavy public 
ownership, protectionism, and a host of governance and corruption problems. A large,   29
negative terms-of-trade shock and/or a group of bank failures may have pushed this 
country into crisis but for the last decade or more it may never have been very far away 
from crisis.  
   Reflecting the focus on economic growth (under Mandate III), the Fund and the country 
authorities might agree that the program ought to have a three year rather than a one year 
tenure, so that any aggregate demand reductions could be made more gradual and so that 
there would be more time for structural reform to take hold. In addition, the Fund might 
ask that the country only make good progress toward external payments viability during 
the program period rather than to actually achieve such viability. In an effort to reduce 
distortions that create an anti-export bias and that hamper efficient resource allocation, 
the program might well call for: scaling-back the extent of price controls and state 
intervention in marketing of exports, foodstuffs, fertilizer, and petroleum products; 
reduction/elimination of surrender requirements and controls on foreign exchange 
allocation; reduced reliance on quantitative restrictions on imports and a reduction in the 
level and dispersion of tariff rates; privatization of selected public enterprises and the 
entering into “performance contracts” with existing managers of public enterprises; 
liberalization of interest rates (and other measures to move from state to market 
allocation of credit); development of financial markets for inter-bank funds, government 
securities, and stocks; and the phasing-out of government-owned banks.  
   To protect the most vulnerable groups, such a program would probably also place 
conditions on the composition of government expenditure cuts, as well as an overall 
target for the budget deficit. Specifically, these structural conditions could call, inter alia, 
for a shift in government expenditure away from military and “showcase” expenditures   30
toward expenditure on primary education and health care; severance pay and retraining 
for workers released from public enterprises that are being privatized; a gradual (rather 
than abrupt) reduction of price controls on commodities that loom large in poor people’s 
budgets; and the creation of an unemployment insurance system. There might likewise be 
provisions for special credit arrangements for agricultural producers and for small and 
medium-sized businesses, and the differential impact of currency devaluation on urban 
consumers versus agricultural exporters might be subject to partial compensation.  As 
part of efforts to combat corruption problems, audits and public disclosure of findings 
might be required of certain financial institutions and/or of government-sponsored 
monopolies, and employment practices in the civil service could be subject to review. 
And core labor standards might be put forward if there were strong evidence of 
significant departures from them.      
  To sum up, what gets included in Fund structural policy conditionality depends in good 
measure on the nature of the crisis and on the extent of interdependence between 
traditional Fund macroeconomic policy instruments and structural policies. But the 
intrusiveness of conditionality also depends on how broad are the objectives of the Fund 
and the country authorities. Trying to get out of the current crisis is one thing. Trying to 
ward off a future crisis is quite another. And trying to spur high-quality growth in a low-
income country with a host of government-induced distortions and large institutional 
gaps is something else again. Yet another relevant factor, particularly as regards the 
intensity or degree of detail in Fund conditionality, is how much confidence the Fund and 
creditor governments have in the willingness of the crisis country to carry through on its 
policy commitments; the greater the skepticism on that score, the greater are likely to be   31
the number of prior actions and other performance tests included in programs. But that 
takes us into the next section. 
 
III. THE STRUCTURAL CONTENT OF FUND POLICY CONDITIONALITY 
AND ITS EFFECTIVENESS  
 
Thus far, I have summarized arguments about Fund structural policy conditionality and 
discussed how the Fund’s mandate might affect the scope and details of such 
conditionality. But I have not discussed the available facts on Fund structural policy 
conditionality, nor the existing literature on the effectiveness of conditionality. That is the 
subject of this section. First, I ask how commonplace, wide-ranging, and detailed 
structural policy conditions have been in Fund programs; whether structural policy 
conditionality seems to be increasing over time; in what policy areas structural 
conditionality has been most intensive; and what performance tests have been used to 
monitor this conditionality. Second, I then ask what we know about the effectiveness of 
that structural policy conditionality, including the track record on compliance with Fund 
conditionality. Most of these questions are not entirely straightforward to answer -- both 
because the relevant data are available only in pieces, and because the “counterfactual” to 
Fund policy conditionality (that is, what would happen in the absence of a Fund program) 
is extremely difficult to know or to estimate. 
  
A. Structural Policies in Fund Programs 
Since there is no comprehensive index of Fund structural policy conditionality that is 
available over a long time period, one has to rely on a set of statistics to tell the story.
29 In 
                                                 
29 In the Postscript to this paper, I discuss several very recent IMF studies on conditionality (IMF [2001) 
that trace the evolution of Fund structural conditionality since the mid-1980s; one of these studies    32
what follows, I review, in turn: (i) data on the number of total structural policy conditions 
per program year for a sample of 20 Standby arrangements (SBAs) and 12 Extended 
Fund arrangements (EFFs) for the 1996-99 period; (ii) data on the average number of 
structural performance criteria for all Fund programs over the 1993-99 period; (iii) data 
on the number of structural policy conditions (overwhelmingly structural benchmarks) in 
recent (1997-2000) Fund programs with three Asian crisis countries (Indonesia, South 
Korea, and Thailand); (iv) data on the average number of structural benchmarks per Fund 
program for 33 transition economies over the 1993-99 period; and (v) data on the number 
of structural benchmarks in earlier SAF programs. For each body of data, I am interested 
not only in the scope and intensity of structural policy conditionality, but also in the 
trend, the differences across different types of Fund programs (SBAs, EFFs, and 
SAF/ESAF/PRGF programs), and the distribution across structural policy areas. 
   Before getting to all that, a brief digression on the instruments that the Fund uses to 
monitor compliance with conditionality is warranted. For the purposes of this paper, four 
of these are of interest. 
   Performance criteria (PCs) are meant to provide a direct link between program 
implementation and disbursement of Fund resources. If the criterion is met on the agreed 
test date (typically set at quarterly intervals), the member country is assured of 
disbursement; if the criterion is not met, the country cannot draw unless a “waiver” is 
obtained. Waivers are granted when a country’s noncompliance with performance criteria 
is viewed by the Fund as inconsequential or when it reflects significant exogenous 
                                                                                                                                                 
(IMF [2001]) also includes an index of total Fund structural conditions going back to 1989. The key 
qualitative conclusions of this section are not altered by reference to the longer data series.    33
developments not foreseen at the time the program was framed.
30 PCs are expected to be 
under the control of the borrower, capable of being precisely and objectively formulated 
and monitored, and subject to relatively short (usually less than 45 days) reporting lags. 
In the structural area, a PC could, for example, specify that elimination of restriction x on 
current payments be accomplished by date y, or that three insolvent finance companies be 
closed by date z. Prior actions are policy measures that the country agrees to take before a 
Fund agreement goes into effect. They are apt to be employed when severe imbalances 
exist and the country is viewed as having had a poor track record of implementation (in 
earlier Fund programs).  Structural benchmarks (SBMs) are indicators which aim to 
delineate the expected path of reform for individual structural policy measures and that 
can facilitate the evaluation of progress for these actions. Because many structural 
policies cannot be expressed in quantitative form, structural benchmarks are usually 
expressed qualitatively; for example, if the program calls for privatization of the state-
owned telephone company, submitting the privatization bill to the legislature by date x 
could be one structural benchmark. Failure to meet structural benchmarks conveys a 
negative signal but does not automatically render a country ineligible to draw; instead, a 
decision about eligibility would be judgmental and would likely be taken in a broader 
mid-year program review --itself an instrument of conditionality -- with an eye toward 
the country’s overall progress on the structural front. Program reviews, like SBMs, assess 
implementation of policies not amenable to monitoring via PCs (because of their 
                                                 
30 Waivers also require that the authorities have taken the necessary action to bring the program back on 
track if this is necessary to meet its objectives.   34
imprecise or qualitative nature). Reviews are broader than individual SBMs and can be 
used, for example, to assess whether there needs to be a change in program design.
31 
   (i) Number of (total) structural policy conditions per program year -- At this point, the 
most comprehensive measure of Fund structural policy conditionality is that produced by 
the Fund itself via its so-called MONA database (which stands for Monitoring Fund 
arrangements). It is the only series available that combines information on all four types 
of structural conditions, namely, performance criteria, structural benchmarks, prior 
actions, and conditions for completion of program reviews. When only one of those 
structural policy conditions is used, there is a danger that you are seeing only one part of 
the elephant. The Fund’s index of programmed structural policy measures is then divided 
by the length of the period to obtain figures on number of programmed structural policy 
measures per annum. The rub is that this comprehensive measure is available only for the 
20 Standby arrangements (SBAs) and 12 Extended Fund arrangements (EFFs) over the 
1996-99 period.
32 To my knowledge, this comprehensive measure of Fund structural 
policy conditions has not been published before.  
  Table 3 presents the goods. Three conclusions stand out. First, the number of structural 
policy conditions that would be typical for say, a three-year EFF Fund program over the 
last few years is high; specifically, it would be more than fifty (3 times the annual 
average of 18 measures per annum).
33 For a typical one-year SBA, it would be 
somewhere between 9 and 15 (depending on whether we used the median or the mean). 
                                                 
31 When conditionality includes a program review, the text of the arrangement specifies what elements are 
to be reviewed; the review also assesses whether or not the program’s objectives are in jeopardy. 
32 See the Postscript for a summary of data going back to 1989. 
33 Because the data in Table 3 are expressed as the number of conditions per annum rather than per 
program, I need to assume that the number of conditions varies proportionally with time to arrive at 
conclusions about the number in conditions in a “typical” three-year program.    35
This is a far cry from the “only in exceptional cases” guideline called for in the (1979) 
conditionality guidelines (for SBAs). Second, the median number of structural policy 
conditions is much higher (double) for EFFs than for SBAs. This is not surprising. As 
noted earlier, EFFs must have a structural policy orientation; SBAs may have structural 
conditionality too but don’t necessarily have to (if structural problems are not viewed as 
serious or pressing).  Note that the difference between SBAs and EFFs vanishes when 
one looks at the mean number of conditions -- a finding that could well reflect the 
presence of a few SBAs with very high structural policy content. And third, there is quite 
a lot of variation across both SBAs and EFFs in the extent of structural policy 
conditionality. Since these data are thus far available only for the 1996-99 period as a 
whole, there is nothing that can be said here about trends.   
   The Fund has broken down its comprehensive measure of structural policy conditions 
into ten broad policy areas. The results are portrayed in Figure 1. In short, what we see 
there is that about two-thirds of structural policy conditions are concentrated in three 
areas: financial-sector policies, tax and expenditure reforms, and public enterprises and 
privatizations. Since the Fund’s core competence is often identified to be monetary, 
fiscal, exchange rate, and financial-sector policies (see, for example, the Council on 
Foreign Relations [1999]), this would seem to belie the charge that, on average, most of 
the Fund’s focus in structural policies is far afield from its main expertise -- or to put it in 
other words, that Fund structural policy conditionality is typically a “mile wide and an 
inch thick.”  At the same time, Figure 1 does show that Fund structural policy 
conditionality has reached into a number of “non-core” structural policy areas (e.g., labor 
markets, social safety nets).   36
   (ii) Average number of structural performance criteria per program -- The Fund’s 
MONA database also contains information on performance criteria (PCs) for the longer 
1993-99 period. Tables 4, 5, and 6 below present the average number of performance 
criteria per program for all Fund programs, for ESAF/PRGF programs, and for SBA and 
EFF programs, respectively; separate figures are also given for the transition economies 
and (in Table 4) for the Asian economies.  In these tables, “quantitative performance 
criteria” refer to macroeconomic variables (e.g., the nominal value of the fiscal deficit, 
net domestic credit of the central bank, the stock of net international reserves, etc) that 
are used to track compliance with monetary, fiscal, exchange rate, and external debt 
policies. “Structural performance criteria” are the ones meant to assess compliance with 
important structural policy commitments. Note that the data here are calculated per 
program -- not per program year. This is more informative in some respects but also 
carries the disadvantage that the annual figures can be biased upward (downward) if there 
are more (less) multi-year arrangements agreed in a given year. Note also that because we 
are dealing only with one component of structural policy conditionality in Tables 4-6, we 
have to be careful about generalizing about the overall intrusiveness of Fund structural 
policy conditionality from these figures. 
   Five main conclusions emerge from Tables 4-6. One is that “structural” PCs are on 
average less numerous than for quantitative macroeconomic PCs -- with the notable 
exception of the three programs for the Asian crisis economies in 1997 (see the upper two 
panels of Table 5 versus the lower one). A second conclusion is that the number of 
structural PCs in the programs with the three Asian crisis economies in 1997 (an average 
of 14 per program) was way above (roughly four times) both the average for all Fund   37
programs over the 1993-99 period (an average of 3.3 per program) and for 1997 alone (an 
average of 7 per program); in contrast, the average number of quantitative 
macroeconomic PCs was actually lower in the Asian economies than for all Fund 
programs. Finding number three is that the average number of structural PCs in programs 
with the transition economies was below (not above) the average for all Fund programs 
over this period. And fourth, there have on average been more structural PCs in 
ESAF/PRGF programs than in SBA and EFF arrangements (taken together). 
    A fifth finding -- at least for all Fund arrangements taken together -- is that we do 
observe some upward trend in the average number of structural PCs as we move from the 
earlier part of the period (2 in 1993-95) to the latter part (3.3, 1996 and 98-99) -- and this 
even if we exclude 1997; that being said, the straw that stirs the drink in the average PC 
numbers is clearly the high figure (14 per program) for the three programs with Asian 
crisis countries in 1997. 
   Unfortunately, there are no directly comparable statistics on average number of 
structural PCs for earlier periods.
34 An (unpublished) IMF [1987a] study on SBAs and 
EFFs during the 1979-87 period does show the breakdown of structural PCs by policy 
area; if I make the (risky) assumption that there was only one PC per policy area 
indicated for each country, I get an estimate of 1.3 structural PCs per program for that 
period -- about a third of the average figure (3.3) for 1993-99 (from Table 4).  Polak 
[1991] reports the average number of total PCs (presumably, quantitative macroeconomic 
PCs plus structural PCs) per program for some earlier periods. Specifically, his figures 
                                                 
34 But see the summary in the Postscript which points to a trend increase in the number of structural 
performance criteria during the 1989-99 period.    38
are less than 6 per arrangement for 1968-77, 7 in 1974-84, and 9.5 in 1984-87.
35 The 
comparable figure taken from Table 4 for average (total) PCs per program over 1993-99 
would be 11.7. If other monitoring components of Fund policy conditionality (prior 
actions, SBMs, conditions for program reviews) moved in the same direction over this 
period -- and Polak [1991] suggests they have -- this would point to a significant increase 
in the monitoring of Fund conditionality over the past thirty years or so. 
  As regards the distribution of structural PCs across policy areas for earlier periods, that 
same 1987 IMF study found that the leading categories were the exchange system (12 
percent) and the trade system (6 percent). The financial sector, which led the parade in 
Figure 1, was in third place in 1979-87 and fiscal policy was yet further behind.      
   (iii) Number of structural policy conditions in recent Fund programs with Indonesia, 
South Korea, and Thailand -- Since Fund structural policy conditionality in three Asian 
crisis countries has had a lot to do with reopening the debate on the appropriate scope and 
detail of conditionality, it makes sense to give those programs a separate look. In Table 7, 
I provide a running count of the number of structural policy conditions --believed to be 
overwhelmingly made up of conditions for program reviews and structural benchmarks -- 
contained in successive revisions of the Indonesian, Korean, and Thai programs over the 
1997-2000 period. In figure 2, I present a rough breakdown of the three crisis programs 
by structural policy areas. In an effort to convey the flavor of the detail in those 
programs, I have also reproduced in Table 8 the first half of the full SBM matrix for 
Indonesia as of June 1998. Perhaps hinting at one of the main conclusions, it was not 
practical to attach the full list of structural policy conditions for all three programs: as a 
                                                 
35 Kapur [2000] reaches similar findings (to Polak [1991]) on the average number of performance criteria in 
the 1970s and 1980s. He, however, also cites a figure of 23 (using a somewhat different sample of   39
group, they are much too long for a paper of this length. As a note of caution, counting 
the number of structural policy commitments says nothing about which conditions are 
more important or are more intrusive. Nor does such a count tell us which commitments 
came at the initiative of the country authorities and which came from the Fund.
36 And 
such a count mixes together what you might call formal conditionality (monitored by 
specific performance criteria and structural benchmarks) and informal conditionality 
(monitored by program reviews). 
  The tale told by Table 7 and by Figure 2 can be summarized as follows. First, the 
number of structural policy conditions included in these programs with the three Asian 
crisis economies is very large (if not totally unprecedented) -- many more than you can 
count using all your fingers and toes.
37 Without claiming any precision, my head count 
from publicly-available documents is that these structural policy commitments summed -- 
at their peak -- to about 140 in Indonesia, over 90 in Korea, and over 70 in Thailand. 
Each of these totals is considerably above the average of about 50-plus for all Fund 
programs over the 1996-99 period. Second, in the programs with Korea and Thailand, the 
number of structural policy conditions was considerably smaller at the beginning of the 
program than at its peak -- perhaps because the country authorities and the Fund first laid 
out the main elements of the structural reform package and then filled in the details as 
they went along, and because implementation of reforms was pretty good (see discussion 
below). In contrast, the number of structural policy conditions in the Fund program with 
                                                                                                                                                 
programs) for the single year 1999.  
36 Fund staff note that country authorities often use an IMF letter of intent to underline or to “advertise” 
policy reforms that have recently been made and those that are expected to be made in the near future -- 
even if those reforms are predominantly “home grown;” see the discussion on this point in the Postscript. 
37 I hesitate to call the total number of structural policy conditions in even the Indonesian program 
“unprecedented” because I am told informally that there was a larger figure (close to 200) in one of 
Russia’s programs with the Fund.   40
Indonesia hits its peak pretty early on and then declines as the program period goes on -- 
perhaps reflecting an initial effort to impress the markets with the extent of intended 
structural reform and then scaling that back as market reaction proved disappointing and 
as evidence accumulated that implementation capacity/willingness would be lower than 
anticipated. Third, while financial-sector restructuring and supervision is the dominant 
policy concentration in all three programs, additional data indicate that the scope of 
structural policy conditionality is much narrower in the Korean and Thai programs than 
in the Indonesian one. Putting aside the financial sector, Thai structural policies are 
mainly focused on tax and expenditure reform and on corporate debt restructuring. In 
Korea, the non-financial areas getting most attention are corporate governance and 
restructuring (and some trade and capital-account liberalization). In Indonesia, structural 
reforms outside the financial sector are more of a mixed bag, with significant 
commitment clusters appearing for privatization and reform of public enterprises, for 
trade systems, for pricing and marketing policies, for corporate restructuring, and for tax 
and expenditure reform; there are also minor clusters for energy and environmental 
policies and for social safety nets. 
   Turning to Table 8, what is striking is the number, scope, and detail of the structural 
policy commitments made by Indonesia -- including in non-traditional areas of 
conditionality. There are, inter alia, measures dealing with reforestation programs; the 
phasing-out of local content programs for motor vehicles; discontinuation of support for a 
particular aircraft project and of special privileges granted to the National Car; abolition 
of the compulsory 2 percent after-tax contribution to charity foundations; appointment of 
high-level advisors for monetary policy; development of rules for the Jakarta Clearing   41
House; the end of restrictive marketing agreements for cement, paper, and plywood; the 
elimination of the Clove Marketing Board; the termination of requirements on farmers for 
the forced planting of sugar cane; the introduction of a micro credit scheme to assist 
small businesses, and the raising of stumpage fees. Enough to say that the great bulk of 
such measures were not included because of their macroeconomic impact; they were 
presumably included instead for anti-corruption reasons, to instill “confidence” in private 
investors that the system was changing, to facilitate monitoring of commitments, and (for 
some commitments) to reflect the structural policy agendas of either other IFIs (the 
World Bank and the Asian Development Bank) or certain creditor countries (see 
discussion in Section IV).
38 
   (iv) Number of structural benchmarks in Fund programs with the transition economies -
- Mercer-Blackman and Unigovskaya [2000] have analyzed the use of SBMs in Fund 
programs for 25 transition economies over the 1989-97 period. Their tally, also derived 
from the Fund’s MONA database, is presented in Table 9. Three observations merit 
explicit mention. 
  First, the average number of SBMs per program is roughly twice as high in ESAF (26) 
and EFF (23) arrangements and as it is for stand-by arrangements (13). Second, although 
the data in Table 9 are not directly comparable with those in Table 3 (not only are the 
time periods different, but the latter include all structural conditions while the former 
include only SBMs), the number of SBMs in standby arrangements for the transition 
economies do not seem too far out of line with the recent averages for SBAs in all Fund 
programs -- and they appear to be much lower than the averages on SBMs in the three 
Asian crisis economies. And third, there is more variation for SBAs in the number of 
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SBMs (ranging from one in Bulgaria and Latvia to 35 in Armenia) than for either ESAF 
or EFF arrangements. 
   Figure 3, taken from Christiansen and Richter [1999], gives the breakdown by policy 
area of structural policy conditions for the Fund’s programs with the transition 
economies.
39 The main message is that the most frequently occurring structural 
conditions were in the area of public-sector management (institutional reform, tax and 
revenue policy, expenditure policy, and public wages and employment). Next in line 
were restructuring and privatizations, and financial-sector reforms. After that, you see a 
fairly even distribution across the remaining areas (energy sector, social safety net, 
agricultural sector, trade regime, exchange system, etc). The top three categories 
accounted together for over two-thirds of structural conditions. 
   (v) Scattered evidence on number of structural benchmarks in earlier SAF programs --    
An unpublished IMF study [1987] of 17 SAF arrangements (for low-income countries) in 
1986-87 also looked at the number and distribution of structural benchmarks. The main 
findings were that the average number of SBMs per SAF arrangement was about 7, that 
there was considerable variation around this average across programs (ranging from 3 in 
the program for Bolivia to 15 for Uganda), and that structural conditions also ranged 
quite widely across policy areas (covering the exchange system, trade liberalization and 
tariff reform, public enterprises, tax and expenditure policy, producer pricing and 
agricultural marketing, and public sector investment programs).  
                                                 
39 The data used to construct Figure 3 are different from that used in Table 10. The former cover (I think) 
all structural policy conditions (not just SBMs) and they also cover the Fund’s initial programs with the 
transition economies under the (lower-conditionality) Systemic Transformation Facility. These differences, 
however are not important for our purposes.   43
   To sum up, structural policy conditionality is now a common and important element of 
Fund conditionality. When you combine prior actions, performance criteria, structural 
benchmarks, and conditions for program reviews, it has been typical (over the past few 
years) for a one-year standby arrangement to have on the order of say, a dozen structural 
conditions and for a three-year EFF arrangement to have say, 50 of them. About two-
thirds of those structural conditions are apt to fall in the areas of fiscal policy, financial-
sector reform, and privatization, with the remainder scattered across a fairly wide field.  
The structural conditions in the Fund’s much discussed programs with three Asian crisis 
economies were more numerous and detailed than is usually the case. Financial-sector 
conditions dominated in all three of those Asian programs but detailed conditions in quite 
a few non-core structural policy areas were also evident -- especially in the case of 
Indonesia. While much of the external criticism of Fund structural conditionality has 
emphasized the wide scope of the Fund’s involvement (e.g., what has the Fund got to do 
with the clove monopoly), our review of the evidence suggests that the number and 
specificity of conditions in core areas (“micro management”) is at least as important an 
issue.
40 
   Those analyzing Fund structural policy conditionality -- including researchers both 
inside and outside the Fund -- are unanimous in concluding that there has been a 
pronounced upward trend in such conditionality over the past fifteen years, and this trend 
has probably become steeper in the 1990s.
41 The evidence reported in this section (much 
of it previously unpublished) strongly corroborates this conclusion. Finally, there has also 
                                                 
40 Saying that the Fund has “micro-managed” some structural reforms is not the same as saying that such 
reforms necessarily lack macroeconomic impact. For example, a condition to reduce significantly the extent 
of wage indexation could be very detailed but might still carry macro impact.   44
been a shift over time in the instruments used by the Fund to monitor structural 
conditionality, with resort to structural benchmarks, conditions for program reviews, and 
prior actions having risen faster than formal performance criteria. Prior to the 1980s, the 
Fund was hesitant to ask for prior actions, and performance reviews regarding structural 
policies were exceptional for standby arrangements.
42 Structural benchmarks apparently 
were apparently not used prior to the establishment of the SAF in 1986. As demonstrated 
earlier, all this is no longer the case. For example, a comparison of the average number of 
structural conditions for standby arrangements in 1996-99 in Table 3 with the figures on 
structural performance criteria in Table 4 suggests that, taken together, structural 
benchmarks, prior conditions, and program reviews have recently been about five times 
as numerous as structural performance criteria. 
   Writing well before Fund programs with the Asian crisis countries, Polak [1991] 
contrasted the principles put forth in the 1979 Guidelines on Conditionality with actual 
practice:  
   “... the guidelines do not attempt to change the structure of conditionality: their aim 
   is limited to making that structure less intrusive by limiting the number of  
   performance criteria, insisting on their macroeconomic character, circumscribing the 
   cases for reviews, and keeping preconditions to a minimum. Yet these  
   restraining provisions have not prevented the intensification of conditionality in 
   every direction that the guidelines attempted to block.” (p. 61). 
 
Nine years later, it’s hard to disagree with that assessment. 
 
 
B. The Effectiveness of Fund Structural Policy Conditionality 
If we take it as given that the Fund has become more “grandmotherly”/intrusive with 
regard to its structural policy conditionality, the next leading question is how effective 
                                                                                                                                                 
41 See, for example, Tanzi [1987], Polak [1991], Killick [1995], James [1998], Krueger [1998], Mussa and 
Savastano [1999], Gupta et al. [2000].    45
has such conditionality been?
43 Here, we address just two aspects of that question: the 
degree of compliance with Fund conditions, and the quality of the Fund policy advice 
implicitly reflected in such structural policy conditionality. Again, much of the available 
evidence is often not in the form best suited to the focus of this paper (that is, it refers to 
compliance with, or the effectiveness of all Fund policy conditions -- not just structural 
policies; or when it deals just with structural policies, it covers only low-income or 
transition economies). Nevertheless, some conclusions can be put forward. In addition, 
some of the recent research on compliance with structural conditions in Fund programs 
with the transition economies is particularly interesting. 
   (i) Compliance with Fund policy conditions -- Clearly, Fund policy conditionality 
cannot have its intended effects if countries do not implement these policies. Two 
measures of compliance are typically found in the literature; the share of IMF loans 
actually disbursed; and the degree of compliance with particular Fund policies (e.g, credit 
ceilings, budget deficits, various structural benchmarks).
44  
   Table 10, adopted from Mussa and Savastano [1999], shows the share of Fund lending 
actually disbursed for 615 Fund programs over the 1973-97 period. While the authors 
caution that a low disbursement share could mean the program was so successful -- or 
conditions improved so rapidly -- that the country needed to use only a fraction of the 
committed IMF financing, they conclude that low disbursement cases mainly were ones 
where the program went off track (because policies deviated significantly from those 
agreed and subsequent negotiations failed to reach agreement on a modified program). 
                                                                                                                                                 
42 See Polak [1991] and IMF [1987]. 
43 The description of Fund conditionality as being “grandmotherly” is from Keynes; see James [1998]. 
44 Another potential measure of compliance would be the share of programs that saw an early conversion of 
the program to a precautionary arrangement.   46
   Here, it is appropriate to highlight three of the Mussa-Savastano findings. First, if we 
take say, disbursement of 75 percent or more of the total loan as implying close 
adherence to IMF policy conditionality, then less than half (45.5 percent) of all Fund 
arrangements over the entire 1973-97 period would have met that test; see column (6) in 
Table 10. Second, again using the 75 percent or greater benchmark, the completion rate 
for standby arrangements (48.5 percent) was notably higher than that for EFF programs 
(25.4 percent) with higher average structural policy content; the completion rate for 
SAF/ESAF arrangements, which also have a relatively high structural policy content and 
deal exclusively with low-income countries, was much higher than for EFFs and only 
slightly below that for SBAs.  And third, there is a suggestion that the completion rate for 
Fund programs is declining over time.
45  
   A very similar exercise on completion rates was undertaken by Killick [1995] for 305 
Fund programs over the 1979-93 period, with results quite close to those obtained by 
Mussa and Savastano [1999]. Killick [1995] defines a “completed program” as one that 
disbursed 80 percent or more of the total Fund loan. He finds that on this measure: 47 
percent of Fund programs were completed, that the completion rate was higher for SBAs 
than for EFFs, that the completion rate was declining over time, and that completion rates 
do not differ (in the expected way) on account of cross-country differences in either per-
capita income or type of export.
46 
   Most earlier studies that looked at compliance with particular Fund policies were 
restricted to macro conditionality. In brief, Beveridge and Kelly [1980] and Edwards 
                                                 
45 I use the term, “suggestion,” because Mussa and Savastano [1999] note that the results on completion 
rates for the 1993-97 period are biased downward due to the inclusion of arrangements with post-1997 
expiration dates.   47
[1989] found that compliance with monetary and/or fiscal performance criteria was 
observed in approximately 48-62 percent of Fund programs. Polak [1991] updated these 
results for SBA, EFF, and SAF programs in the 1980s and found that compliance rates 
for the 1980s were below those for the 1970s.  Killick [1995] cites one unpublished 1991 
IMF study that looked at compliance with structural policies in SAF and ESAF programs: 
slightly over half of all structural benchmarks were observed on schedule (or two thirds 
within a few months thereafter); and compliance was relatively high for agricultural 
producer-pricing and marketing and for financial reforms, and relatively low for fiscal 
provisions (and especially for public enterprise reforms).   
   Two more recent studies of compliance with Fund structural conditionality have been 
conducted for the transition economies by Christiansen and Richter [1999] and Mercer-
Blackman and Unigovskaya [2000].
47 Four of their findings are of interest. First, the on-
time compliance rate for structural benchmarks as a group averaged 42 percent, with an 
additional 16 percent of conditions met with delay; the remaining 42 percent of 
conditions were either not met or no information was available. Second, the compliance 
rate for performance criteria (both macro and structural taken together) was higher than 
that for structural benchmarks. Third, the correlation between the number of structural 
benchmarks in a program and the completion rate for those structural policies was 
negative, although neither large nor statistically significant. And fourth, while there was 
sizeable variation in the compliance rate across structural reform categories, the standard 
                                                                                                                                                 
46 Killick [1995] did find some evidence that completion rates were lower for highly-indebted countries and 
for those that received relatively low access to Fund resources. 
47 A caveat should be noted with respect to studies of the transition economies. Because of the centrality of 
structural policies to their reform efforts in the 1990s, their experience with structural policy conditionality 
may be “special” and not necessarily transferable to economies where structural policies occupy a less 
central role.   48
deviation of compliance across countries was more than twice as great as that for 
compliance by reform category.
48  
   To sum up, existing studies suggest that obtaining compliance with Fund conditionality 
has been a serious problem, including the Fund’s structural policy conditionality. The 
compliance problem has been getting more serious over time. Compliance has been lower 
for EFF programs than for standby arrangements (but not apparently for SAF/ESAF 
programs). Compliance has also been lower for structural benchmarks than for 
performance criteria.  Correlations between the compliance rate and the number of 
structural conditions , along with measures of the variability of compliance across 
program areas and countries suggest that greater selectivity both in the countries 
approved for structurally-oriented programs and in the structural measures included in 
such programs could have a high pay-off in terms of compliance rates.
49 Further studies 
on a broader sample of countries would be useful in sharpening these conclusions, 
including the important issue of whether or not the product of the number of structural 
conditions and the compliance rate is approximately a constant. 
   (ii) Effectiveness of structural policy conditionality -- Even if countries consistently 
complied with Fund structural policy conditions, this would not necessarily constitute an 
endorsement for such conditionality unless it can be shown that these are “good” 
structural policy requirements that lead to “better” economic performance. Evidence 
relevant for answering that latter query can be gleaned from at least five sources: (a) 
                                                 
48 The on-time compliance rate was highest (57 percent) for public wage and employment conditions and 
lowest (29 percent) for price and marketing conditions. Ukraine had the lowest overall compliance rate (14 
percent of structural conditions met on time), while Lithuania had the highest (82 percent). 
49 It is relevant to note that the 1979 “Conditionality Guidelines” suggest that the Managing Director of the 
IMF should only recommend that the Fund’s Executive Board approve a program when it is his judgement 
that the program..... will be carried out;” see Guideline Number 7 in Table 2.   49
econometric studies that estimate the effects of IMF programs (as a whole) by comparing 
program and non-program countries/periods; (b) studies that relate either structural policy 
action within a Fund program or structural policy action more generally (whether in Fund 
programs or otherwise) to economic growth; (c) studies that relate measures of corporate 
governance to the extent of exchange rate depreciation or stock market decline during the 
Asian crisis; (d) a comparison of Fund structural policy recommendations with the 
“consensus” of the economics profession on what are “good” structural policies; and (e) a 
review of the Fund’s structural policy recommendations in the Asian crisis countries. 
   (a) Studies on the effects of IMF programs as a whole -- By now, there is an extensive 
empirical literature on the effects of IMF programs.
50 If one defines “program effects” as 
the observed outcome (for growth, inflation, the balance of payments, etc) relative to the 
“counterfactual” (that is, the outcome in the absence of an IMF program), then it is clear 
that most of the early literature had serious methodological flaws.
51 “Before-after” 
comparisons are not reliable because they attribute all the change in outcomes to a Fund 
program when exogenous shocks and other influences may really be causing that change. 
Comparison of program targets and outcomes will not be useful when program targets are 
set too ambitiously or not ambitiously enough. Simulations of economic models can tell 
us something about the effect of Fund-type policies but not about the effects of actual 
Fund programs. And comparisons of outcomes for program and non-program countries 
will not do the job if the two groups differ systematically in ways that matter for 
economic performance. Over time, most of these methodological problems have been 
addressed. Nowadays, studies typically seek to identify program effects after controlling 
                                                 
50 For a recent survey of this literature, see Haque and Khan [1998].  
51 See Goldstein and Montiel [1986].   50
both for non-program effects and for observed (pre-crisis) differences between program 
and non-program countries.  
   Still, even the best studies have only indirect implications for the effectiveness of Fund 
structural policy conditionality since they do not disaggregate the contents of a Fund 
program into its macro and structural policy components. In any case, what such studies 
usually find is that Fund programs have a favorable impact on the current account and 
overall balance of payments, that the effect on inflation is statistically insignificant, and 
that the effect on economic growth is initially (with the first year) negative but probably 
turns positive at longer time horizons;
52 too little econometric work has been done on 
income distribution to say much.
53  
   One possible explanation for why such studies do not generate large positive growth 
effects for Fund programs is that compliance with the policies that matter for medium to 
long-run growth is far from complete (as demonstrated above); also, some countries that 
are in trouble implement on their own policies that are not so different than those 
included in Fund programs. It has also been argued that even non-program countries have 
been influenced by the “silent revolution” in economic thinking on the importance of 
sound macroeconomic and structural policies and that the Fund has contributed 
importantly to this revolution (that is, non-program countries are not a good “control 
group” because they too are affected by the policy treatment).
54 A second explanation is 
that the lags associated with the effects of structural policies on economic growth are 
long and hence, may show up only after the country has left a Fund program. Yet a third 
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53 See, however, the recent study by Garuda [2000] who finds that Fund programs improve income 
distribution and poverty reduction for countries with relatively modest pre-crisis external disequilibria but 
worsen them for countries with severe pre-crisis external imbalances.   51
explanation is that the results are right: despite all the rhetoric on “growth-oriented 
adjustment,” Fund programs are still mainly about getting out of financial crises and 
don’t much matter for growth in the medium to long-run. 
   (b) Links between broad measures of structural policy reform and growth -- This is a 
more recent literature, much of it connected with understanding the economic 
performance of the transition economies.
55 
   One strand looks at whether greater compliance with Fund structural policy 
conditionality is associated with better growth performance. Here, the recent study by 
Mercer-Blackman and Unigovskaya [2000] is worth noting. They find that, after 
controlling for other factors, those transition economies that demonstrated higher 
compliance with IMF structural performance criteria had better records of sustained 
economic growth (defined as three consecutive years of positive real GDP growth); in 
contrast, they could find no significant association between compliance with Fund 
structural benchmarks and sustained growth. They also report that transition economies 
that did better on complying with Fund structural performance criteria also showed 
greater progress on implementing structural reform more generally.
56  One interpretation 
of their first finding is that the (relatively few) structural policies included as performance 
criteria are more important for growth than the larger number regarded as structural 
                                                                                                                                                 
54 See, for example, Krueger [1998]. 
55 There is of course a much broader and older literature on effects of alternative structural-policy strategies 
(e.g., Balassa’s [1983] work on outward-looking vs. inward-looking policy strategies) and on the 
determinants of growth in developing countries more generally (e.g., Barro [1996]). In addition, there are 
many studies that take a non-quantitative approach to evaluating Fund structural policies; see, for example, 
Schadler et al. [1995] who (looking at Fund programs during the 1988-92 period) concluded that “...there 
was a broad measure of success in accomplishing structural reform....” (p. 29).  
56 Progress on structural reform is measured using a structural reform index, derived from De Melo et al. 
[1996] and EBRD Transition reports. This index is meant to capture liberalization of prices and foreign 
exchange markets, small and large-scale privatization, governance and restructuring reforms, legal reforms, 
interest rate liberalization, and banking reforms; see Havrylyshyn et al. [1999].   52
benchmarks. The authors concede that some of their results are also consistent with other 
views; for example, countries with better growth performance may find it easier to 
implement Fund structural conditions, and the unobserved “commitment to reform” may 
explain both Fund program implementation and progress on structural policy action more 
generally.             
   The other strand of this literature tests for an association between structural reform -- 
whether achieved within the context of a Fund program or not -- and economic growth. 
A good example is the recent study by Havrylyshyn et al [1999], which examines the 
growth experience of 25 transition economies over the 1990-97 period. After attempting 
to hold other determinants of growth constant (including initial economic conditions, 
inflation, size of government, degree of openness, etc), they find that the greater was 
progress on an index of overall structural reform, the higher was economic growth.
57 
They also tested whether individual components of structural reform aided growth but 
found that only price liberalization had significant explanatory power when the overall 
reform index was also included -- a finding which they interpret as suggesting that it is 
the “combination” of structural policies that is more critical for growth than any single 
type of policy.  
   A similar growth exercise for 84 low and middle-income countries during the 1981-95 
period is summarized in IMF [1997]. In these pooled, cross-section regressions, the 
authors find that after controlling for other determinants of per capita GDP growth, 
improved macroeconomic policies and improved structural policies both have significant 
                                                 
57 Fischer et al [1996] reached a similar conclusion in an earlier paper on the growth experience of the 
transition economies. Because there are very few transition economies that have not had a program with the 
IMF, a comparisons of program and non-program countries is not a viable research strategy.    53
effects on growth in the expected direction. They also conclude that behavior of growth 
in ESAF countries does not differ fundamentally from that in other developing countries. 
   (c) Corporate governance and the Asian financial crisis -- As suggested earlier, there 
has been much discussion of the role that governance and corruption issues played in the 
Asian financial crisis. A new study by Johnson et al [2000] provides some interesting 
empirical results and insights. The authors look at the behavior of nominal exchange rates 
and stock markets from the end of 1996 through January 1999 for 25 emerging 
economies. Their aim was to see if cross-country differences in measures of corporate 
governance (e.g., judicial efficiency, corruption, rule of law, protection for minority 
shareholders, creditor rights, etc.) could do a better job at explaining the extent of 
exchange rate depreciation and stock market decline than could standard macroeconomic 
measures (e.g., fiscal and monetary policy, current account imbalances, international 
reserves, foreign debt, etc.). In brief, they find that the corporate governance horse does 
better than the macroeconomic horse, particularly for stock market movements. They 
argue that “institutions’ that protect investor rights are not important as long as growth 
lasts (because managers do not want to steal). But when growth prospects decline and 
there is even a small loss of investor confidence, countries with only weakly enforceable 
minority shareholder rights become particularly vulnerable. This is because outside 
investors reassess the likely amount of expropriation by managers and adjust the amount 
of capital they are willing to provide (resulting in a fall of asset values and a collapse of 
the exchange rate). On some of Johnson et al’s measures of corporate governance -- 
particularly rights of minority shareholders -- several Asian crisis countries (particularly   54
Indonesia and Thailand) ranked low and hence, were more vulnerable to the effects of a 
downturn.           
   (d) Fund structural policy conditionality and the “consensus” -- In 1983 at a conference 
on IMF conditionality, Richard Cooper [1983] offered the following view: 
   “... we could choose any five people present and make a team to work up an economic 
   adjustment program for a particular country other than our own... the program we  
   came up with not differ greatly from a typical IMF program.” (p. 571). 
I am more skeptical that we could make the same statement today, at least about Fund 
programs for the Asian crisis countries. Nevertheless, I would still maintain that the 
general thrust of the Fund’s structural policy recommendations falls squarely in what my 
IIE colleague, John Williamson [1990] has labeled “the Washington policy consensus.” 
Whether it’s interest rate deregulation, trade liberalization, tax reform, the currency 
regime, foreign direct investment, price liberalization, or banking reform, Fund structural 
policy advice is typically not far from the consensus. Writing 15 years after Cooper, Ann 
Krueger [1998] offers a similar assessment: 
   “Many of the lending changes supported by the Bank and the Fund (in, for example, 
   exchange rates, size of fiscal deficits, trade liberalization, agricultural and energy  
   price reforms, privatization, and tax reform) are ones that would be endorsed in 
   broad outline, if not in detail, by almost all economists.”  
   But saying that the Fund’s structural policy advice has generally reflected the 
profession’s consensus view does not mean that this advice has not at times gone 
seriously astray. Three examples illustrate the point. First, along with several of its larger 
G-7 shareholders (particularly the U.S. and the U.K.), the Fund often pushed hard on 
emerging economies to undertake capital account liberalization without due regard to the   55
adequacy of the host country’s regulatory and supervisory framework.
58 In Korea, for 
instance, the Fund apparently urged liberalization of both short-term and long-term 
flows.
59 But when the Koreans said they would only go for the former, the Fund 
apparently regarded this as better than nothing and accepted it.
60 A second example 
concerns Fund advice on privatization in transition economies. There, the Fund [2000] 
acknowledges that privatization runs the danger of producing perverse results in the 
absence of hard budget constraints, competition, and effective standards of corporate 
governance. As with capital-account liberalization, a more selective approach to 
privatization with greater attention to sequencing would, with the benefit of hindsight, 
have been better. Yet a third example was the initial Fund recommendation in Indonesia 
to go with a limited deposit guarantee for banks rather than a blanket guarantee.
61 In 
drawing the lessons of the Asian crisis, the Fund (Lindgren et al. [1999]) now concludes 
that in a systemic crisis a blanket guarantee is needed to restore confidence in the 
financial system.
62 
   (e) Fund structural policy conditionality in the Asian crisis countries --I will confine my 
remarks on the Fund’s structural policy recommendations to four points. 
   First, I find the underlying rationale for dealing immediately with insolvent and weak 
banking and finance companies compelling. Without such action, it probably would have 
                                                 
58 One of the few observers who stated publicly his concerns (before the crisis) about the magnitude of 
short-term capital inflows going into Asian emerging economies was Park [1996]. 
 
60 In appraising Fund structural policy recommendations made in the late 1980s, Schadler et al.[1995, p. 31] 
similarly conclude: “.... Coordinated programs for structural reforms would have been desirable but were 
generally not politically or administratively feasible. It is appropriate, therefore, that programs supported 
the second-best strategy of seizing opportunities for reform on as broad a front as possible. This process 
cannot give a large role to sequencing considerations, but these are not unambiguous and could unduly 
slow the process.” 
61 A comprehensive guarantee was introduced in Indonesia two months later. 
62 As suggested below, I do not share this view on the use of blanket guarantees but many others do.   56
been impossible to restore monetary and currency stability (since large-scale liquidity 
support to insolvent institutions would have worked at cross-purposes), and the fiscal tab 
for bank recapitalization would have been even higher than it has turned out to be (since 
managers of insolvent institutions would have engaged in more “gambling for 
resurrection”). Moreover, I don’t think confidence could have been restored without 
some concrete evidence that financial-sector supervision (including transparency and 
disclosure) was going to be “started” on a different path for the future than it had been on 
in the past. Similarly, to show that cronyism and corruption would henceforth be less 
prevalent, it was important (at least in Indonesia) to take a few visible 
privileges/sweetheart deals away from those close to President Suharto. Once the crisis 
deepened and non-performing loans of banks and corporate insolvencies became larger 
and more widespread, it also became evident that banks and corporates -- particularly in 
Thailand and Indonesia -- would not simply be able to grow out of it without 
restructuring. Because of strong links between banks and corporates (especially in Korea 
and Indonesia), as well as the need to cushion somewhat the most vulnerable groups from 
the effects of the crisis, there was a good case for including some corporate reforms  
(e.g., reduction of debt-equity ratios by the chaebol) and some social safety net provisions 
in those programs. 
   Second, notwithstanding the above argument, there were elements of structural  
conditionality in the three Fund programs with Indonesia, Korea, and Thailand that seem 
superfluous. I don’t find persuasive the argument that trade liberalization measures in the 
Indonesian and Korean programs were necessary to prevent a slide toward   57
protectionism.
63 A better rationale would be that trade liberalization was needed to 
increase competition and to help discipline inefficient domestic producers. But that still 
doesn’t argue for why trade liberalization needed to be done immediately rather than after 
the crisis. Likewise, I don’t see why the Indonesian program had to be so sweeping with 
respect to dismantling of state monopolies and cartels, elimination of restrictive 
marketing agreements, abolition of showcase projects, and the like -- disagreeable as 
those practices were. For “confidence” reasons, a few “candies” may have had to be 
taken away from cronies at the outset but the rest of the box (and admittedly, it was a 
very big box) could have waited for later. In the Korean program, the tax reform and 
privatization conditions look like they could have waited until after the crisis. And in 
Thailand (which had the narrowest of the three programs), it’s hard to see why 
privatization of state enterprises, removal of the real estate tax on foreign purchases of 
condominiums, and a new land act needed to be part of the Fund’s conditions.  
   Moving from the width to the depth of conditionality, the level of detail reflected in the 
structural benchmarks for these three programs likewise seems excessive. For example, 
in Indonesia, was it necessary to have five commitments for reform of oil and gas policy, 
and 18 commitments for follow-up actions to the findings of the audit of Bank Indonesia? 
In Korea, was it essential to have 11 commitments for restructuring, for investment 
guidelines, and for corporate governance of insurance companies? And in Thailand, did 6 
target dates have to be set up to guide the privatization of Bangkok Metropolitan and 
Siam City banks? More generally, did supervisory and prudential measures for financial 
institutions in the three crisis countries have to be specified so precisely; wouldn’t say, a 
broader commitment to implement the Basle Core Principles of Effective Banking 
                                                 
63 See Hamann and Shulze-Ghattas [1999].   58
Supervision by date x, along with a few benchmark checks of good progress, be as 
effective (and less intrusive) and, in addition, carry the seal of approval of the world’s 
key banking supervisors? Couldn’t the Fund provide its very detailed views on ways of 
improving corporate governance as technical assistance -- not as conditions in the Fund 
program? Yes, this would require more faith that the crisis country would want on its 
own to “do the right thing.” But if it doesn’t really want to implement the reforms, then 
very detailed monitoring via a very large set of structural benchmarks may not push the 
ball much farther ahead. Besides, unlike performance criteria, failure to meet many of the 
structural benchmarks does not carry the automatic threat of interruption of Fund 
financing.      
   Third, I don’t agree with either the Fund or many of its critics that the Indonesian 
experience leads to the lesson that bank restructuring during a systemic banking crisis can 
only be accomplished successfully if blanket guarantees are issued by the government.
64 
The closing of banks in Indonesia led to runs because the authorities were only willing to 
close a subset of a much wider group of insolvent banks, because high-level political 
support (from President Suharto and some others) for the initial bank closures was absent, 
and because the Fund agreed to a bad compromise. When there are widespread bank 
insolvencies, the key to restoring confidence is to convince the public that all the bad 
banks have been closed or resolved, that the remainder are solid, and that small retail 
depositors (not everybody) will be covered.
65 As a former colleague of mine put it, 
“people don’t run banks that are closed; they run banks that are open that they think will 
soon be closed.” Also, when there is no deposit insurance in place or the insurance 
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system is not viewed as credible, the necessity is for the bank supervisory authority to 
replace the old management of insolvent banks with a new one (so as to prevent “double 
or nothing” behavior and even larger credit losses), and to eventually dock the 
shareholders (so as to penalize the owners and to limit moral hazard); such insolvent 
banks can then be resolved in a variety of alternative ways (even while they honor 
withdrawals and take deposits). What’s not necessary -- and can prompt runs -- is to 
board up the teller cages of some banks (while other questionable banks remain open). 
The real lesson of the Indonesian experience is that a sensible, incentive-compatible, 
deposit insurance system (along the lines of FDICIA in the United States) should be 
permanent part of the financial infrastructure in all countries; without it, governments 
wind-up providing ex post deposit insurance but they do it at higher current cost and with 
moral hazard effects that increase the likelihood of future banking crises.  
   A recent World Bank report supports the view that blanket guarantees are not the 
answer to resolving emerging-market financial crises. After conducting empirical tests 
based on data from 700 corporations in nine crisis countries (including three Asian crisis 
countries), Claessens et al. [2001] conclude that: 
    “The analysis on data of corporate sector performance suggests that unlimited 
    government guarantees on bank liabilities have no impact on both the recovery and 
    sustainability. Given that they are fiscally very costly, this suggests governments 
    should avoid guarantees.” (p.19).   
   In much the same spirit, I disagree with those who say that bank capital requirements 
should have been phased-in even more slowly in the Asian crisis countries so as to 
prevent a credit crunch. A cutback in lending exposure is an equilibrium response of a 
bank to a negative shock that reduces its capital. The relevant question is not whether one 
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likes a credit crunch; it is whether one prefers some credit crunch to an expansion of 
lending -- much of which is likely to go to the same insolvent borrowers that were at the 
root of the banks’ difficulties (leading to even large bank losses). To be sure, there was a 
fall-off in real credit supply in late 1997 and early 1998 in most of the crisis countries, 
and undoubtedly some “good” borrowers were also denied credit. But there was also a 
fall in real credit demand that apparently was sharper than the fall in supply (at least in 
Korea and Thailand);
66 in addition, there is some evidence that the allocation of bank 
credit improved.
67 In the end, I doubt whether we would have obtained a better combined 
score card on economic activity and on bank losses if capital requirements were less 
binding during 1998-2000. 
   Drawing on a sample of 34 countries (27 of them developing or transition economies) 
which have experienced significant fiscal costs from bank failures over the 1970-2000 
period, Honohan and Klingebiel [2000] compare “regulatory forbearance” versus “strict” 
approaches to crisis resolution. They find that unlimited deposit guarantees, open-ended 
liquidity support, repeated recapitalizations, debtor bail-outs, and regulatory forbearance 
add significantly and sizably to costs. And one of their main conclusions bears repeating: 
   “... our findings clearly tilt the balance in favor of a ‘strict’ approach to crisis 
   resolution, rather than an accommodating one. At the very least, they emphasize 
   that regulatory authorities which choose an accommodating or gradualist 
   approach to an emerging crisis need to be sure that they have some other way 
   of controlling risk.” (p. 19).  
   Fourth, compliance with the Fund’s structural policy conditionality appears to have 
been much better than the average (for all Fund programs) in Korea and in Thailand but 
not so in Indonesia. Notable progress has been made on financial-sector rebuilding and 
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reform but much remains to be done. And it’s still too early to know whether the 
excessively close relationship between large business and government that has been the 
source of so much inefficiency and favoritism has changed fundamentally for the better. 
   It’s not easy (especially for an outsider) to measure compliance with structural policy 
conditions because the Fund programs with the three crisis countries were revised often 
over the 1997-2000 period, and because some structural benchmarks have been 
dropped/added from one revision to the next. Still, suppose we define compliance as 
having met a condition within say, three months of the target date. Then my ballpark 
estimate would be that Korea has complied with about 90 percent of the structural 
conditions laid out in the Fund’s program.
68 The corresponding compliance figure for 
Thailand would be about 70 percent. Two areas where compliance was weak in Thailand 
were reform of state banks and privatization of public enterprises. The calculation for 
Indonesia is subject to the largest margin of error but probably falls in the 20-40 percent 
range. In Indonesia, compliance with structural conditions has been seriously 
handicapped by prolonged political instability and by a weak approach by the 
government toward debtors; compliance has been lower in non-core policy areas than in 
core areas.    
   The problem with just looking at the share of structural conditions met is not only that 
some are more important than others, it is also that most structural policy conditions 
capture processes that do not necessarily have a tight link with outcomes. For example, if 
the structural benchmark says you must have two outside directors appointed to a 
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corporate board, that can be done but the outside appointees may not differ much from 
their predecessors. Or a loan can be “restructured” but in a way that doesn’t much reduce 
the present discounted value of the borrower’s debt burden. For this reason, it is useful to 
look at some other, less process-oriented benchmarks for the financial and corporate 
sectors. 
  As background, we should recall that the three crisis countries (as a group) experienced 
a sharp output recovery in 1999 and 2000; inflation is low in Thailand and moderate in 
Korea; low interest rates have helped to support the recovery; and current accounts are in 
surplus (although much reduced from the huge current-account surpluses of 1998); see 
table 11. In addition, the crisis countries (as a group) have much lower ratios of short-
term external debt to international reserves than immediately preceding the crisis; they 
have abandoned publicly-declared exchange rate targets; and both non-performing loans 
in the banking system and corporate insolvencies are retreating from their peaks. They 
are moving in the right direction -- albeit much too slowly --on banking supervision and 
corporate governance. And in Korea, debt-equity ratios for most of the largest chaebol 
have declined sharply.  
   Turning to the negative side of the ledger: the sharp growth slowdown in the United 
States, along with the downturn in global electronics, have brought export growth 
throughout emerging Asian to a standstill and are likely to preface slower overall 
economic growth in the region for 2001 (see Table 11); Japan’s faltering recovery, its 
continuing financial fragility, and a weaker yen have added to external strains; equity 
prices have declined sharply in the region; volatile oil prices remain a source of great 
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uncertainty; public debt burdens have risen sharply in the crisis countries (reflecting the 
enormous fiscal costs of financial-sector restructuring) and, in concert with fiscal deficits, 
now limit the scope for counter-cyclical fiscal policy (at least outside Korea); bank 
lending to the private sector has generally been weak; and there are widespread and 
growing concerns that the pace, and particularly the quality, of financial-sector 
restructuring have been less satisfactory than hoped for a year or two ago.  
   Table 12, taken from Claessens et al. [1999], World Bank [2000], and national sources, 
provides a summary of financial restructuring in the three crisis countries (as of 1999-
2000). A few additional comments can serve to supplement the information in table 12. 
   Korea has used a combination of recapitalizations, nationalizations, removal of bad 
debt, and mergers to strengthen its banking system.
69 Investment trusts and merchant 
banks have undergone significant consolidation. Rapid economic growth in 1999-2000 
aided the restructuring effort and the large build-up of international reserves has provided 
some protection against liquidity shocks. Banking supervision and regulation have been 
strengthened but risk management skills and practices on the ground are in need of 
substantial upgrading. The non-bank financial sector is still regarded as fragile. Despite 
considerable progress from pre-crisis levels, Korean corporations remain highly 
leveraged, profitability is low, and surveys suggest that interest coverage is a problem for 
many of them. A growing concern is that pressure for fundamental corporate 
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restructuring is easing, reflecting, inter alia, government support to corporate bonds, labor 
disputes, and the political calendar.
70   
   Thailand has closed about two-thirds of its finance companies but has gone slower on 
bank restructuring, asking the banks to raise their own capital and making injections of 
public money subject to stricter prudential and management changes.
71  Until recently, 
the authorities opted for a decentralized approach to asset management companies. 
Although banks have raised large amounts of capital and comply with regulatory 
provisioning requirements, most independent analysts regard Thai banks as 
undercapitalized in an economic sense. Loan classification procedures for restructured 
loans are lax, and the share of non-performing loans (while much reduced from peak 
levels) is still high. Bank lending has declined. Corporate debt restructuring seems to 
have slowed after a promising start, and much of it has taken the form of maturity 
rescheduling. The judicial system is weak and has had difficulty coping with large 
caseloads. A noteworthy positive development has been the sale of local banks to foreign 
banks, bringing the latter’s share of total banking assets to above 15 percent. 
   Turning to Indonesia, the sheer scale of problems, political instabilities, and a set of 
institutional weaknesses have combined to limit the progress made on financial 
restructuring.
72 As indicated in table 12, even after huge public outlays that have brought 
the state’s ownership share of banking assets to more than 70 percent and that now mean 
that about 40 percent of fiscal revenues have to be directed to debt-servicing costs, the 
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71 See Tsao [2001a] for more on Thailand’s financial restructuring. 
72 See Tsao [2001b], Claessens et al. [1999], and World Bank [2000] for discussion and evaluation of 
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share of non-performing loans remaining in the banking system is much higher than in 
the other Asian crisis countries. Regulatory forbearance still exerts a large influence on 
loan classification practices, and the quality of loan restructuring is regarded as low. New 
bank lending has not resumed on any significant scale. The restructuring of state-owned 
banks has been slow. The recent depreciation of the rupiah and increases in interest rates 
have subjected financial restructuring to stronger head-winds. Notwithstanding a larger 
volume of corporate restructuring deals in the second half of 2000, the pace of asset 
disposition by the government-backed Indonesian Bank Restructuring Agency (IBRA) 
has been extremely slow. As outlined by Tsao [2001b], politically-powerful debtors 
seeking to avoid dilution of ownership, unrealistic valuations, a weak judicial system, and 
the size of the bad loan portfolio relative to the thinness of the market -- have all 
contributed to this unhappy outcome. Progress on voluntary out-of-court debt settlements 
has been evident but these account for only a tiny share of problem loans under IBRA’s 
control. Stronger protection for creditors is needed, along with a greater emphasis on 
asset sales, new equity, and debt/equity conversions. Also high on the agenda should be 
further consolidation and recapitalization of banks and wide-ranging reforms of corporate 
governance. As indicated in table 12, corporate ownership remains highly concentrated 
among the top 15 families in all three Asian crisis countries.  
   To sum up, studies of the effects of Fund programs show that they have positive effects 
on the current account and overall balance of payments; effects on growth, inflation, and 
income distribution have proved to be much harder to pin down with any precision. 
Those transition economies that have done more on implementing Fund structural 
performance criteria appear to have done better on economic growth and structural policy   66
reform more generally than those with weaker compliance records. Those emerging 
economies with better corporate governance structures in place prior to the outbreak of 
Asian crisis were, on average, hit less hard with currency and stock market declines 
during the crisis than those with a poorer track record on corporate governance.  For the 
most part, Fund structural policy recommendations reflect the economics profession’s 
consensus of what constitutes sensible structural policy reform, although some serious 
mistakes on sequencing of reforms have sometimes taken place. The “core” of the Fund’s 
structural policy conditionality in the three Asian crisis countries -- which focused mainly 
on financial-sector crisis-management and restructuring -- was appropriate, with the 
exception of the bad compromise made on bank closures in Indonesia. That said, the 
Fund’s structural conditionality in the Asian crisis countries (and especially in Indonesia) 
appears “excessive”-- both in scope and in detail. Thus far, compliance with that 
conditionality has been high in Korea, above average in Thailand, and below average in 
Indonesia. Looking at a broader array of indicators, progress on restructuring in East Asia 
is visible but much more needs to be done to put banks and corporates on a sound 
footing. It is too early to tell whether the past close relationship between government and 
business has changed fundamentally for the better.  
 
IV. HOW DID FUND STRUCTURAL POLICY CONDITIONALITY GET TO BE 
THIS WAY?   
             
If one concludes that Fund structural policy conditionality has become more intrusive 
than necessary, it is relevant to speculate on how it might have gotten that way. In my 
view, nine factors have contributed to that trend.
73 
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   First, in the 1970s and early 1980s, Fund programs came under sharp criticism from 
many developing countries as being too demand-oriented and too short run, and as not 
paying enough attention to economic growth, to supply-side reforms, and to income 
distribution. The disappointing growth performance of developing countries in the early 
1980s added to those concerns. Since it was developing countries that increasingly 
constituted the “demand” for Fund resources, neither the Fund nor creditor governments 
could easily dismiss that criticism. New lending windows with higher structural policy 
content and with lending terms more favorable to low-income countries were created, and 
monitoring techniques for gauging compliance with structural policy conditions evolved. 
   Second, the expansion of the IMF’s surveillance responsibilities – agreed in the mid-
1970s under the second amendment of the Fund’s charter and given expression in the 
revised Article IV – permitted Fund Article IV country missions to take a wider field of 
view in evaluating economic developments and prospects. Structural problems thus came 
under greater scrutiny. This greater familiarity with structural problems may in turn have 
led to a greater readiness to include structural policy conditions in programs – at least in 
those cases when structural weaknesses were perceived, rightly or wrongly, to have been 
linked to crisis vulnerability. 
   Third, the huge transformation task faced by the transition economies -- especially in 
the first half of the 1990s -- made structural policies and the building of a market 
infrastructure the name of the game in that region. And the IMF (along with the EBRD) 
was at the center of the technical assistance and policy lending to those transition 
economies. Again, structural benchmarks came to be relied upon as a way of monitoring   68
structural policy conditionality across a wide front. When structural problems arose in  
later crises (Asia), the same monitoring techniques were applied. 
   Fourth, all the while, the Fund was more and more interpreting its mandate as broader 
than just promoting macroeconomic and financial stability and helping countries to 
manage financial crises. From the mid-1980s on, economic growth and later, high-quality 
growth, were given increased prominence. And after the Mexican peso crisis of 1994-95, 
crisis prevention -- with particular attention to strengthening financial systems at the 
national level and developing international standards and codes of good practice -- too 
moved up on the agenda. 
   Fifth, crises that involve severe balance-sheet problems of banks and private 
corporations lead to more structural policy intensive Fund programs than do those that 
stem from traditional monetary and fiscal policy excesses -- and the Asian crises of 1997-
98 had those balance-sheet problems in spades. The IMF’s Executive Board also seems to 
have sent staff the message (in 1997) that lending into serious governance and corruption 
problems (without any measures to address them) would not receive Board support. In 
the Indonesian program, a decision was made to try and impress the markets with the 
comprehensiveness of the reform effort. 
  Sixth, the long-standing and growing problem of obtaining good compliance with Fund 
programs led over time to greater reliance on prior actions and to more wide-ranging and 
detailed structural policy conditions -- presumably in an effort to penalize poor earlier 
track records, to thwart evasion, and to detect slippage at an earlier stage.
74 If this broader 
and more detailed conditionality didn’t produce higher compliance and the amount of   69
structural reform hoped for, maybe the Fund concluded that it was still inducing more 
structural reform than would obtain with lesser Fund structural policy conditionality. The 
Fund’s Guidelines for Conditionality -- which might have reined-in excessive structural 
policy conditionality --came to be viewed by the Fund’s Executive Board as broad 
principles of intention -- not as something to be monitored carefully and enforced. 
   Seventh, in the meantime, a wide array of legislative groups, NGOs, and even other 
international financial organizations, came to the see an IMF letter of intent as the 
preferred instrument of “leverage” for their own agendas in emerging economies. Yes, 
the ILO might be the logical place to push core labor standards but it doesn’t have the 
teeth of an IMF program. Simultaneously, various G-7 governments -- and particularly 
the Fund’s largest shareholder -- were finding it increasingly difficult to get congressional 
support for “clean” IMF funding bills. Reflecting this congressional pressure from both 
major parties, the U.S. Executive Director at the Fund has been obliged to support with 
voice and vote a long list of structural policies (ranging from protection of the 
environment, to promoting economic deregulation and privatizing industry), and the U.S. 
Treasury is required to report annually to the Congress on its compliance with relevant 
sections of the Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related Programs 
Appropriation Act of 1999. A reading of that report (U.S. Treasury [2000b]) confirms 
that the United States frequently pushed for policies in Fund programs that were far from 
the Fund’s core competence. Likewise, in countries where there was prolonged use of 
Fund resources, IMF letters of intent sometimes became an instrument of leverage which 
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the Finance Ministry could use to push structural reforms on other departments in the 
government that were opposed. In short, everybody has gotten in on the act. 
   Eighth, unlike other IFIs, the Fund and the World Bank have sufficient “ground troops” 
to do on-site visits to all countries. In addition, at least in official circles, the Fund has 
developed a reputation as able to act quickly and efficiently. When new structural 
challenges have arisen, there has therefore been a tendency to say, “give it to the Fund; 
they go there anyway; have them just add a few specialists on problem x to the mission.” 
And the management of the Fund has apparently not said “no” very often to those 
demands. 
   Finally, there have been occasions -- the Korean and Indonesian programs are 
important cases in point -- when strong pressure from particular G-7 governments (during 
program negotiations) resulted in the inclusion of specific structural policies in a Fund 
program -- and this despite the provision in the Fund’s charter (IMF [1988, p. 42], Article 
XII, Section IV) for each member country of the Fund to “... refrain from all attempts to 
influence any of the (Fund) staff in the discharge of [their] functions.” 
 
V. APPROACHES TO STREAMLINING FUND STRUCTURAL POLICY 
CONDITIONALITY 
 
The Fund’s new Managing Director, Horst Kohler, has already indicated that he thinks 
that the Fund “... has been overstretched in the past and needs to refocus (Kohler [2000a, 
p. 3]); he has also flagged his intention to end “mission creep” -- in large part by 
streamlining structural policy conditionality (Financial Times [2000b]). In seeking to 
carry out that objective, there are at least eight approaches (not all of them mutually 
exclusive) worth mentioning.   71
   (i) structural pre-conditions -- This radical approach, favored by the majority of the 
Meltzer Commission (see Meltzer Report [2000]), would jettison ex-post Fund 
conditionality in favor of a small number of pre-conditions, namely, freedom of entry and 
operation for foreign financial institutions, regular and timely publication of the maturity 
structure of outstanding sovereign and guaranteed debt and off-balance sheet liabilities, 
adequate capitalization of commercial banks, and a proper fiscal requirement.
75 
Developing countries that met these pre-conditions would be eligible immediately for 
short-term liquidity assistance; those developing countries that didn’t meet them would 
not be eligible. 
  Objections to this approach have been registered on three counts.
76 
  While meeting these pre-conditions would reduce the risk of getting into a crisis, they 
would hardly be sufficient for crisis prevention. Although many currency and debt crises 
begin in the banking sector, quite a few others do not, and freedom of entry plus a capital 
requirement are not good substitutes for the broader range of measures outlined in the 
Basle Core Principles of Effective Banking Supervision.
77 The fiscal policy pre-condition 
is not defined in the report and making it operational would be subject to the same kind 
of negotiation and intrusiveness as with present Fund conditionality. 
   More fundamentally, even if satisfied, these pre-conditions would not get a country out 
of a balance-of-payments crisis once it got into one. Without measures to reduce 
absorption and to switch expenditure from foreign to domestic goods, the crisis country’s 
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ability to repay won’t improve. And giving large Fund loans to a country with a runaway 
inflation and/or a huge budget deficit would increase moral hazard -- not reduce it. 
   Last but not least, it is highly questionable whether the international community would 
be willing to exclude completely from IMF financing countries that didn’t meet these  
pre-conditions, particularly when a new government promised policies different from its 
predecessor.
78 For this reason, the CFR Report [1999] rejected the “all or nothing” 
approach and opted instead to penalize (reward) countries that have followed poor (good) 
policies by charging them higher (lower) interest rates when they needed to borrow from 
the Fund. 
   (ii) collateralized Fund lending -- Another radical approach to reducing or eliminating 
Fund structural policy conditionality would have the Fund follow the Bagehot [1873] 
guideline and lend on good collateral.
79 Good collateral is meant to serve several 
purposes. It provides a test of whether the borrower is just illiquid rather than insolvent (a 
solvent borrower has good collateral to pledge, an insolvent one does not). It safeguards 
the solvency of the lender. And it reduces (borrower) moral hazard by discouraging the 
borrower from holding risky assets that would not be accepted as good collateral. 
   Opposition to the collateral proposal emanates from several arguments. If eligible 
collateral is defined narrowly and strictly (say, holdings of U.S. government securities), 
then it won’t provide much additional advantage in crisis management (since countries so 
endowed wouldn’t need to come to the Fund -- they could borrow from private markets). 
Pledging collateral to the Fund might also run afoul of “negative pledge” clauses in 
                                                 
78 See Polak [1991]. U.S. Treasury [2000a] argues that these pre-conditions would have precluded the IMF 
from responding to financial emergencies in the vast majority of its member countries, including all the 
Asian crisis countries. 
79 See Meltzer [1999] and Feldstein [1999].   73
existing loan agreements and even if it didn’t, its favorable impact would be limited since 
it would raise borrowing costs on the non-collateralized debt. Some would contend too 
that liquidating the collateral (say, export receipts) in the event of repayment problems 
(stemming either from bad luck or poor policy performance) would subject the Fund to 
even harsher criticism from developing-country borrowers than it receives when it 
interrupts disbursement under a Fund program. Would the United States, for example, 
have been able politically to cash-in the collateral (oil receipts) pledged by Mexico 
during the 1994-95 peso crisis if things had not worked out so well for Mexico in 1995?    
   (iii) define conditionality in terms of outcomes not structural policies or benchmarks -- 
The idea here would be for the Fund to leave the process by which countries respond to 
crises up to them and instead condition Fund assistance on positive changes in certain 
outcomes. For example, instead of making changes in the judicial system or the 
establishment of a new framework for corporate debt restructuring conditions of the 
program for Indonesia, the Fund could just say that half of the non-performing corporate 
debt has to be rescheduled by date x. If the country meets the target, it gets the money; 
otherwise, it doesn’t. 
   The rub here is that performance criteria normally are confined to variables that are 
under the control of the borrower. The difficulty with defining structural conditionality 
only in terms of outcomes is that exogenous developments could affect the borrower’s 
ability to meet the target. As such, there would be many demands for “waivers.” In 
addition, outcomes are often not easy to define for some structural policies (e.g., what is 
“good” banking supervision, or what constitutes a “restructured” loan). And one of the 
main purposes of the Fund is to rule certain crisis-management processes (e.g.. increased   74
resort to trade restrictions) as out of bounds. Still, it’s possible that a mixed approach 
could be employed where some conditions would be defined in terms of outcomes, while 
others would be defined in terms of intermediate variables and/or processes.  
   (iv) Put restrictions or penalties on foreign-currency borrowing -- If much of structural 
policy conditionality comes from balance-sheet problems of banks and corporates and the 
latter, in turn, often derive from the build-up of large currency mismatches, why not 
attack the problem at its source by seeking to discourage foreign-currency borrowing?
80 
Presumably, a key reason why Brazil has had a much milder crisis than the Asian 
countries is that currency mismatching in Brazil was better controlled; hence, when the 
real crashed, there were many fewer banking and corporate insolvencies. While 
(enlightened) government borrowers ought to be able to internalize these externalities, 
not so for private borrowers who may expect either a government bail-out (if things go 
badly) or who may be driven to take up the cheaper foreign-currency loan because 
competitors are doing it. While timely publication of aggregate data on currency and 
maturity mismatching may improve market discipline, some have proposed going much 
farther. Krueger [2000], for example, has suggested that foreign-currency obligations 
incurred by domestic residents of emerging economies be made unenforceable in 
domestic courts.  Others have argued that the currency mis-matching problem is a 
powerful argument in favor of dollarization. 
   One counter-argument is that such measures are too drastic for the problem at hand. If 
currency mis-matching is the problem, why not have the government develop better 
hedging mechanisms (e.g., futures exchanges), as Mexico has been doing since it moved 
to a floating rate. Others might say that giving up (via dollarization) the potential   75
advantage of access to easy monetary policy during a severe recession just to minimize 
the risk of one particular type of crisis is allowing the tail to wag the dog.  Enforcement 
of currency-matching restrictions could also be a problem. In today’s world of structured 
derivatives, what looks like a domestic-currency loan could well have embedded options 
that amount to an unhedged bet on the exchange rate. 
   (v) greater resort to international standards -- Instead of custom-tailoring structural 
conditions to a particular crisis situation or particular financial institutions, the Fund and 
its member countries could rely more on generic international standards. For example, if 
there was a serious problem with data disclosure, or with banking supervision, or with 
corporate governance, the crisis country could agree to meet international standards in 
these areas by date x. A potential appeal of the standards is that they represent the 
consensus on good practice in that area by a group of international experts -- not the 
views of an individual mission chief or even of the Fund.
81 Since the Fund is already 
engaged (on a voluntary basis) in evaluating countries’ compliance with standards and 
codes, this approach might also afford more flexibility in the time frame for meeting 
these conditions.  
   The disadvantage of the standards approach is that the standards themselves may not be 
specific enough to address the pressing problems at hand. If the elements of the standards 
are too vague, monitoring would likely lead to frequent disagreements. 
   (vi) leaner structural conditionality within present arrangements -- Under this approach, 
the Fund’s Executive Board would issue a new guidance note calling for “leaner” 
structural conditionality; henceforth, each structural condition included in a program 
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would have to be directly related to financial stability and would have to carry a 
macroeconomic impact; in addition, the note might increase the use of formal 
performance criteria relative to more discretionary structural benchmarks and program 
reviews.
82 The aim of this new guidance note would not only be to induce mission chiefs 
to be less wide-ranging and detailed in their structural policy recommendations but also 
to dissuade both creditor and debtor governments from pushing for structural conditions 
that did not fall within the Fund’s core competence (I’d like to help you Mr. Deputy 
Minister, but that just isn’t our job). Associated with this leaner structural conditionality 
might also be an effort to increase the Fund’s leverage for structural policy reform in 
non-program channels. For example, structural weaknesses could be given more attention 
in published Fund Article IV reports, leaving it more to the private markets to apply 
pressure for reform. And much of what now appears as detailed structural benchmarks (in 
a Fund program) on how to implement a given structural reform could be handled in 
Fund technical assistance.  
   Skeptics might argue that the existing guidance note on conditionality that has been 
around for twenty years or more is perfectly adequate. Why would a new one make much 
of a difference? To make a difference, management and the Fund’s Executive Board 
would have to be much more committed to enforcing the new note than they were in 
enforcing the previous one. But this would be unlikely to happen unless there was a clear 
“understanding” with the G-7 and with emerging economies that greater restraint would 
be exercised than heretofore in assigning the Fund new tasks. For example, just within 
the past few months, the G-7 has requested the IMF to step up its monitoring of money 
laundering. Questions would also arise on how many structural conditions and how much 
                                                 
82 See the Postscript for excerpts from such a new (September 2000) guidance note on conditionality.   77
detail would be appropriate for such a “leaner” structural conditionality (that is, would it 
be a big change from prevailing practice or only a small modification). 
   (vii) allowing the Fund to borrow in the private capital markets -- If some G-7 
legislatures use the Fund’s requests for funding (increases in quota, funding for new 
facilities and debt initiatives, etc) as points of “leverage” to impose a variety of (counter-
productive and superfluous) conditions on Fund lending practices, it might be argued that 
the Fund should be given authority to borrow in the private capital markets (thereby 
increasing its independence).
83 Those who oppose this proposal would contend that the 
Fund itself -- not G-7 legislatures -- is the main source of excessive structural 
conditionality; as such, easier funding would reduce “accountability” to the Fund’s 
shareholders and might just as well increase the scope of Fund conditionality as reduce it. 
  (viii) clearer division of responsibility with the World Bank and more outsourcing of  
structural conditionality in non-core areas -- The aim here is to retain the advantages of a 
“comprehensive” approach to crisis prevention/management, sustainable growth, and 
poverty reduction, while improving the effectiveness of (total) structural policy 
conditionality by paying greater attention to the different comparative advantages of the 
various IFIs. Even if the number of structural conditions in Fund programs remained 
unchanged, the Fund would design and monitor only those conditions which fit within its 
defined “core competence” (say, monetary, fiscal, exchange rate, and financial-sector 
policies); anything else, would be the responsibility of the World Bank or other IFIs. If 
one of the other IFIs was not moving fast enough in drafting a structural policy 
requirement, the Fund would not be permitted to take over. It would have to stay in its 
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own yard. Under some proposals, the Fund would transfer primary responsibility for 
running the Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility (PRGF) to the World Bank, although 
the Fund would still have a sign-off on the adequacy of macroeconomic policies in such 
programs with low-income countries. Under other proposals (see Kohler and Wolfensohn 
[2000]), the Bank would get its own new lending window (the Poverty Reduction 
Support Credit) to support poverty reduction in low-income countries, and the Fund 
would continue to run and fund the PRGF. Renewed efforts would also be made to 
improve Fund/Bank cooperation.   
   Here too, there are many potential objections and questions. If the problem is too much 
and too detailed structural policy conditionality as a whole, why would rearranging 
responsibilities among the IFIs solve it? If the PRGF is about poverty reduction and if 
that is supposed to be the main focus of the World Bank, why does the Fund run that 
facility? If it’s true, as suggested by the U.S. Treasury [2000b], that unless the Fund’s 
Board has its own money at stake, Fund evaluation of macroeconomic policies in 
programs with low-income countries won’t be done seriously (even with a formal sign-
off in programs run by the Bank), why should we expect other IFIs to be diligent in their 
evaluation of structural policies in Fund-led programs? Why do we need two lending 
facilities (the existing PRGF in the Fund, and the new PRSC in the Bank) to support 
poverty-reduction and macroeconomic stability in the low-income countries; wouldn’t 
one make more sense? How will the Fund and Bank cooperate more closely with other 
international organizations (e.g., OECD, BIS, ILO, WTO, etc) under the “contracting-out 
model” and still meet the demanding time requirements of crisis resolution?  
   79
VI. CONCLUDING REMARKS    
  I agree with Stanley Fischer’s [2000b, p. 2] assessment that “... the IMF.... promotes 
good macroeconomic and financial-sector policies among its members.” But my reading 
of the record is that on structural policies the Fund has bitten off more -- in both scope 
and detail -- than either it or its member countries can chew. There are limits -- no matter 
how numerous and detailed the Fund’s monitoring techniques -- to how far the Fund can 
push a country to undertake structural reforms that it itself is not strongly committed to. 
Consistent with this view, compliance with Fund conditionality has been a serious and 
growing problem. IMF mission chiefs have considerable knowledge and experience in 
macroeconomic and financial policies but not in structural policy areas beyond this core 
competence. Efforts to include in Fund conditionality everything but the kitchen sink 
under the a loosely defined agenda of pursuing “high quality” growth have taken the 
Fund too far from its comparative advantage and have elicited legitimate charges of 
“mission creep.” 
   Among the alternative crisis management guidelines discussed in Section II, the one 
(Mandate II) that would have the Fund focus on macroeconomic and financial stability 
and assist a country not only to get out of its current crisis but also to minimize the 
chances of getting into another one makes the most sense to me. Conditions that lie 
outside the core areas of monetary, fiscal, exchange rate, and financial-sector policies 
should be significantly fewer in Fund programs than the average of the past five years 
and should require strong justification in any program, including having a 
macroeconomic impact (as called for in the original conditionality guidelines for stand-by 
programs). I also read the record as suggesting that the effectiveness of Fund structural   80
conditionality would be increased if a small number of structural performance criteria 
were substituted for the vast array of structural benchmarks that have characterized many 
past Fund programs. This would require Fund staff to think harder about which structural 
conditions merited the highest priority in the reform effort, and about which structural 
policy changes needed to be done now (during the crisis) and which could wait until 
somewhat later; putting more weight on a few structural performance criteria would also 
send a clearer signal to the borrower that failure to meet those performance criteria would 
likely result in a halt in Fund disbursements. 
   Last but not least, streamlining and improving Fund structural policy conditionality is 
about Fund management saying “no” more often than in the past -- to requests for Fund 
assistance where the expectation is low that the country will actually implement Fund 
policy conditions, to G-7 governments when they propose new tasks for the Fund that go 
beyond the Fund’s core competence, to NGOs who seek to use a country’s letter-of-intent 
with the Fund to advance agendas (even if desirable) that lie outside the Fund’s mandate 
and comparative advantage, and to developing-country finance ministries that want to use 
micro conditions in Fund programs to impose spending discipline on other government 
ministries that could not be obtained via their national legislatures.  
   Mr. Kohler’s intention to end mission creep at the Fund and to streamline the Fund’s 
structural policy conditionality is welcome. But it remains to be seen how he will pursue 
that objective and what the effects will be. 
 
* *  *  *  *  *   81
POSTSCRIPT 
The original version of this paper was presented in October 2000 at an NBER conference 
on “Economic and Financial Crises in Emerging Market Economies,” held in Woodstock, 
Vermont; the paper has been revised in light of comments made at the Woodstock 
conference and of subsequent developments. In February 2001, the IMF published its 
own set of papers on conditionality in Fund-supported programs, including much new 
factual material on the Fund’s involvement in structural policies (IMF [2001a, 2001b, 
2001c, 2001d]). Of particular relevance, several of the new Fund papers contain a longer 
time-series on Fund structural conditions than was available when my paper was written. 
Specifically, the MONA data base figures for the 1993-99 period (used in my paper) 
were supplemented with data from country papers covering Fund programs approved 
over the 1987-92 period. In addition, IMF [20001c] presents some new results on 
implementation of Fund structural policies, obtained from a staff survey of recent 
programs in 24 countries. Also, a published summary of the recent IMF Executive Board 
discussion on conditionality in IMF programs (IMF [2001e]), along with a recent press 
briefing on this topic (Ahmed [2001]), shed light on how the Fund’s views on the 
appropriate scope and detail of structural conditionality are evolving.  
   In my view, almost all the qualitative conclusions presented in my paper are reinforced 
by the new data contained in IMF [2001c], although there are, not surprisingly, some 
non-trivial differences between the Fund and me on the right interpretation of these data; 
in a few areas (e.g., the average number of structural conditions across different types of 
programs, that is, SBAs versus EFFs versus SAF/ESAF/PRGF), data for the longer 
period present a different picture than data for the 1996-99 or 1993-99 period. While one   82
cannot hope to do justice in a brief summary to the wealth of factual material in IMF 
[2001c], I highlight below a number of key findings from the longer and/or more 
extensive data base; on a few points, I also provide my own interpretation of these 
findings. 
   (i) Structural conditionality in Fund-supported programs has increased substantially 
since the mid-1980s. In 1985-86, fewer than one-fifth of upper-credit-tranche SBAs and 
EFFs contained structural performance criteria; by the late 1980s, almost two-thirds of 
Fund programs were subject to structural conditionality of some kind, and by the mid-
1990s, the inclusion of structural conditionality was nearly universal. Likewise, the 
average number of total structural conditions (per year) in Fund programs has been on a 
steep upward trend since the mid-1980s -- rising from a mean of two per year in 1987, to 
seven in 1994, to 14 in 1997-99.  
   (ii) While the rise in structural conditions over time applied to all types of monitoring 
instruments (prior actions, performance criteria, structural benchmarks, and program 
reviews), the rise in aggregate structural conditionality primarily reflects a proliferation 
of structural benchmarks. The next steepest increase was for prior actions and program 
reviews. The average number of structural performance criteria also increased since the 
late 1980s and early 1990s, but stayed in a relatively moderate range at or below two (per 
year).  
   (iii) While the share of programs with structural conditionality has always been higher 
for EFFs and for SAF/ESAF/PRGF programs than for SBAs, differences across types of 
programs in the average number of structural conditions (per year) have not been uniform 
over time and are not easy to generalize. On the whole, SAF/ESAF/PRGF programs   83
appear to have been subject to a higher average number of structural conditions than 
either EFFs or SBAs; however, there have been years where the converse was true. For 
example, in both 1997 and 1995, the average was higher for SBAs than for 
SAF/ESAF/PRGF programs, and in 1996 and 1998, the average was higher for EFFs than 
for SAF/ESAF/PRGF programs. More often than not over the 1990s, SBAs have 
contained a higher average number of structural conditions per year than EFFs (although 
as noted in Section III of my paper, medians tell a different story than the means for the 
1996-99 period). The distinction in structural conditionality between SBAs and EFFs has 
become increasingly blurred, reflecting the approval of SBAs with extensive structural 
content in the transition economies and in other countries.  
   (iv) According to the Fund’s count, in 1997-98 the average number of total structural 
conditions in Fund programs with three Asian crisis countries (Indonesia, South Korea, 
and Thailand) was much higher than in programs with other non-transition, middle-
income countries, somewhat higher than in (SAF/ESAF) programs with low-income 
countries, and somewhat lower than in programs with transition economies. Moreover, 
the (high average) figures for the Asian crisis countries were heavily influenced by the 
large number of structural conditions in the EFF program with Indonesia. 
   The Fund also notes that in addition to structural benchmarks, prior actions, 
performance criteria, and program reviews, many Fund programs contain extensive lists 
of structural measures in their letters of intent -- including detailed policy matrices with 
specific implementation schedules (of the kind displayed in Table 8 of this paper for 
Indonesia and used to estimate the number of structural policy commitments in Table 7). 
Since letters of intent are used to lay out the authorities’ entire policy program and can   84
include measures not formally covered by Fund conditionality, the Fund argues that using 
policy matrices to gauge Fund structural conditionality can lead to a gross overestimate 
of the scope and detail of such conditionality. At the same time, the Fund acknowledges 
that there appears to be a degree of substitutability between these matrices and structural 
benchmarks in practice, and that such policy matrices are sometimes viewed even within 
the Fund as part of Fund conditionality. Since the Fund’s decision to support a country’s 
program presumably depends on the totality of the country’s policy commitments in 
relation to its policy problems, and since policy commitments made by the authorities on 
their own this period could, if not implemented, become part of Fund conditionality next 
period, I believe it is misleading to count in Fund conditionality only those policy 
commitments that are covered by formal Fund conditions. Nor do I see how any outsider 
(not privy to program negotiations) could tell which policy commitments were influenced 
by the Fund and which were not. In the end, counting all policy commitments with a 
specific implementation schedule (in the letter of intent) as part of Fund conditionality 
overstates true Fund conditionality, while excluding all commitments not covered by 
formal Fund monitoring instruments understates it. When all is said and done, I doubt 
that the overall appraisal on whether Fund structural conditionality has been appropriate 
will depend on these differences in the definition of the number of structural conditions 
(see discussion below). 
   (v) Until the mid-1980s, structural reforms in Fund programs were mainly confined to 
the exchange and trade system, with occasional forays into selected fiscal and financial-
sector issues. In the late 1980s, Fund programs began to cover an increasing variety of 
structural measures. An index of concentration of Fund structural measures was   85
constructed that takes on the value of one when all measures are concentrated in one 
sector and the value of zero whey they are uniformly distributed across 14 sectors. For all 
Fund programs, this index of concentration declined from 0.61 in 1987-90 to 0.45 in 
1997-99, suggesting a trend increase in the breadth of structural conditionality. Still, 
close to two-thirds of Fund structural conditions relate to reforms in the fiscal and 
financial sectors, the exchange and trade system, and economic statistics.  In all country 
groups, reforms in the fiscal and financial sector now play a dominant role. 
   (vi) The increase over time in the average number of structural conditions in Fund 
programs also reflects a trend toward greater detail in Fund monitoring. Whereas in 1987-
93 close to two-thirds of the (cross-country) variation in the total number of structural 
conditions per program could be explained by variations in the breadth of programs’ 
structural agenda, in 1994-99 variations in the scope of structural conditionality 
accounted for just 40 percent of the variation in structural conditions. The Fund 
concludes (IMF [2001c]) that greater detail in monitoring structural reforms may have 
played a more important role in contributing to the expansion of structural conditionality 
than coverage of a wider range of structural issues. 
   (vii) While the new Fund papers on conditionality (unfortunately) do not address issues 
of program design (i.e., whether the structural content of programs was appropriate), they 
do contain the results of a new staff survey of recent programs in 24 countries. The 
programs included were selected by area departments of the Fund and, in terms of 
regional coverage, were regarded as fairly representative of the total population of 
programs in recent years.    86
   The survey results indicated that less than 30 percent of the structural measures 
considered in Fund letters of intent were considered to be “critical” for the program’s 
macroeconomic objectives, with another 40 percent seen as “important.” The 
corresponding figures for structural measures subject to specific Fund conditions were 40 
percent (“critical) and 33 percent (“important”). In my view, the finding that Fund staff 
itself regarded only 30-40 of all structural reforms included in Fund programs as 
“critical” for achievement of the program’s macroeconomic objectives is consistent with 
an assessment that Fund structural conditionality has become excessive. 
   Another set of results from the staff survey related to the degree of implementation of 
structural reforms. Here, the main findings can be summarized as follows: (i) policy 
implementation in the structural area was not as good as in the macroeconomic area; (ii) 
some two-thirds of the structural measures in programs appeared to be fully 
implemented, many albeit with considerable delay; (iii) the average implementation rate 
was the lowest in the transition economies and in low-income countries with 
SAF/ESAF/PRGF programs; in contrast, the average implementation in the Asian crisis 
countries was nearly 90 percent; (iv) implementation rates were highest (80 percent) for 
prior actions, lower (66 percent) for performance criteria, and lowest (57 percent) for 
structural benchmarks; and (v) implementation rates (i.e, the share of measures 
implemented), while varying widely, are essentially uncorrelated with the number of 
structural conditions. 
   I suspect that the survey results may be biased upward with regard to implementation 
rates. I say that for several reasons. To begin with, since the countries selected for the 
survey were chosen by the area departments (rather than randomly or by the researchers   87
doing the study) and since the answers provided by survey respondents may have been 
seen by them as reflecting on their own performance as mission chiefs and/or mission 
members, there is a danger of selection bias and of overly optimistic appraisals. In this 
regard, it is reported in IMF [2001c] that the average implementation rate was higher for 
the programs covered by the survey than for the larger sample of programs in the MONA 
data base. Second, the average implementation rate for all programs reported in the 
survey is not consistent with the implementation rates implied by the low share of Fund 
programs that exhibited full disbursement (see Table 10 in Section III). And third, the 
very high implementation rates reported by the survey for the Asian crisis countries 
(nearly 90 percent) are considerably above those that I have been able to obtain from 
analysis of Fund documents and from other sources of information; the low 
implementation rate for Indonesia alone would seemingly make it difficult to get a group-
average implementation rate for the Asian crisis countries of nearly 90 percent. 
   Although clearly a useful first step, I would also question the robustness of the result 
(from bi-variate regressions) that the implementation rate for structural measures is 
unrelated to the number of structural conditions included in the program.  Clearly, other 
factors (e.g., the degree of political instability in the program country) are likely to be 
important in determining implementation rates and these need to be held constant to 
isolate the independent effect of the extent of structural conditionality. I look forward to 
further empirical work on this issue.             
   (viii) Last but not least, taken as a group, recent Fund statements and papers on 
conditionality are much more accommodating (than their predecessors) to the views that   88
past Fund structural conditionality may well have been excessive, and that efforts should 
be made to streamline such conditionality in the future. 
   One can see this shift of view in many places, including: in the broad thrust of the 
“Interim Guidance Note on Streamlining Structural Conditionality,” issued by IMF 
Managing Director Kohler in September 2000 (Kohler [2000c]); in the new papers on 
Fund conditionality (IMF [2001]) reviewed above; in the published summing-up of the 
IMF’s Executive Board’s recent (March 21, 2001) discussion of conditionality (IMF 
[2001e]; and in recent press briefings given by senior IMF staff administering 
conditionality (e.g.Ahmed [2001]. A number of excerpts from these publications 
illustrates the new push for “parsimony” and “prioritization” in structural conditionality. 
   “If structural reforms meet the macro-relevance test but are neither critical nor in the 
   Fund’s core areas of responsibility, Fund conditionality would generally not apply.” 
“Streamlining Structural Conditionality in Fund-Supported Programs: 
Interim Guidance Note” 
   Issued by IMF Managing Director, Horst Kohler, September 2000, Kohler [2000c]. 
  
  “While experiences regarding the extent of structural conditionality and policy 
   implementation have varied widely across countries, there are indications that in 
   a significant number of cases, structural conditionality has moved beyond what 
   seems consistent with the principal of parsimony, underscoring the need for 
   streamlining .... It points to the need for greater prioritization based on the  
   importance of specific structural reforms for a program’s macroeconomic 
   objectives.”               
     “Structural Conditionality in Fund-Supported Programs, “ IMF [2001c], p. 85. 
 
   “The scope of structural conditionality should be streamlined following two main 
   approaches. One is by limiting Fund conditionality to what is essential (and not 
   merely relevant) to program objectives. A second, which is applicable to PRGF 
   countries, is to make use of a coordination framework to achieve a better division 
   of labor with the World Bank, permitting each institution to confine  
   conditionality to its core areas while ensuring that the concerns of both institutions are 
   satisfied.” 
    “Conditionality in Fund-Supported Programs -- Policy Issues,” IMF [2001b], p. 44. 
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   “... Directors agreed that there was a need to streamline and focus the Fund’s  
  conditionality. The aim of the streamlining should be to leave the maximum possible 
  scope for countries to make their own policy choices, while ensuring that the Fund’s 
  financing is provided only if these policies that are essential to the purposes of the 
  Fund continue to be implemented.” 
 
  “While these principles would need to be interpreted carefully on a case-by-case basis, 
  they would shift the presumption of coverage from one of comprehensiveness to one of 
  parsimony -- thus requiring a stronger burden of proof for the inclusion of specific 
  structural measures as conditions in an arrangement, particularly where these measures 
  were outside the Fund’s core areas.” 
 
  “Directors agreed that Letters of Intent (LOIs) should make a clearer distinction 
  between the authorities’ overall policy program and that part of the program that is 
  subject to the Fund’s conditionality.” 
 
  “Since conditionality cannot compensate for the lack of program ownership, Directors 
  agreed that the Fund should seek to limit its financing in such cases.”   
 
“IMF Executive Board Discusses Conditionality,” Public Information Notice No. 01/28, 
March 21, 2001, IMF [2001e], pp. 1-4. 
 
 
  “If you look at the PRGF programs that have been approved by the Board, since the 
  Interim Guidance Note was issued last September, on average, the number of  
  structural conditions in them is significantly lower -- I believe it’s about a third 
  lower-- than the PRGF programs prior to that date.” 





*   *   *   *   *   * 
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 Table 1. Purposes of the IMF
1. To promote international monetary cooperation through a
permanent institution which provides the machinery for consultation
and collaboration on international monetary problems.  
2. To facilitate the expansion and balanced growth of international
trade, and to contribute thereby to the promotion and maintenance
of high levels of employment and real income and to the
development of the productive resources of all members as primary
objectives of economic policy.
3. To promote exchange stability, to maintain orderly exchange
arrangements among members, and to avoid competitive exchange
depreciation.
4. To assist in the establishment of a multilateral system of payments
in respect of current transactions between members and in the
elimination of foreign exchange restrictions which hamper the
growth of world trade.
5. To give confidence to members by making the general resources of
the Fund temporarily available to them under adequate safeguards,
thus providing them with opportunity to correct maladjustments in
their balance of payments without resorting to measures destructive
of national or international prosperity.
6. In accordance with the above, to shorten the duration and lessen
the degree of disequilibrium in the international balance of
payments of members.
The Fund shall be guided in all its policies and decisions by the
purposes set forth in this Article.Table 2. Conditionality guidelines for Fund stand-by lending
1. Members should be encouraged to adopt corrective measures, which could be
supported by use of the Fund's general resources in accordance with the Fund's
policies, at an early stage of their balance of payments difficulties. The article IV
consultations are among the occasions on which the Fund would be able to discuss
with members adjustment programs, including corrective measures, that would
enable the Fund to approve a stand-by arrangement.
2. The normal period for a stand-by arrangement will be one year. If, however, a longer
period is requested by a member and considered necessary by the Fund to enable
the member to implement its adjustment program successfully, the stand-by
arrangement may extend beyond the period of one year. This period in appropriate
cases may extend up to but not beyond three years.
3. Stand-by arrangements are not international agreements and therefore language
having a contractual connotation will be avoided in stand-by arrangements and
letters of intent.
4. In helping members to devise adjustment programs, the Fund will pay due regard to
domestic social and political objectives, the economic priorities, and the
circumstances of members, including the causes of their balance of payments
problems.
5. Appropriate consultation clauses will be incorporated in all stand-by arrangements.
Such clauses will include provision for consultation from time to time during the
whole period in which the member has outstanding purchases in the upper limit
tranches. This provision will apply to whether the outstanding purchases were made
under a stand-by arrangement or in other transactions in the upper credit tranches.
6. Phasing and performance clauses will be omitted in stand-by arrangements that do
no go beyond the first credit tranche. They will be included in all other stand-by
arrangements but these clauses will be applicable only to purchases beyond the first
credit tranche.
7. The Managing Director will recommend that the Executive Board approve a
member's request for the use of the Fund's general resources in the credit tranches
when it is his judgement that the program is consistent with the Fund's provisions
and policies and that it will be carried out. A member may be expected to adopt
some corrective measures before a stand-by arrangement is approved by the Fund,
but only if necessary to enable the member to adopt and carry out a program
consistent with the Fund's provisions and policies. In these cases the Managing
Director will keep Executive Directors informed in an appropriate manner of the
progress of discussions with the member.Table 2 (continued)
8. The Managing Director will ensure adequate coordination in the application of
policies relating to the use of the Fund's general resources with a view to maintaining
the nondiscriminatory treatment of members.
9. The number and content of performance criteria may vary because of the diversity of
problems and institutional arrangements of members. Performance criteria will be
limited to those that are necessary to evaluate implementation of the program with a
view to ensuring that the achievement of its objectives. Performance criteria will
normally be confined to (i) macroeconomic variables, and (ii) those necessary to
implement specific provisions of the Articles or policies adopted under them.
Performance criteria may relate to other variables only in exceptional cases when
they are essential for the effectiveness of the member's program because of their
macroeconomic impact.
10. In programs extending beyond one year, or in circumstances where a member is
unable to establish in advance one or more performance criteria for all or part of the
program period, provision will be made for a review in order to reach the necessary
understandings with the member for the remaining period. In addition, in those
exceptional cases in which an essential feature of the program cannot be formulated
as a performance criterion at the beginning of a program year because of substantial
uncertainties concerning major economic trends, provision will be made for a review
by the Fund to evaluate the current macroeconomic policies of the member, and to
reach new understandings if necessary. In these exceptional cases the Managing
Director will inform Executive Directors in an appropriate manner of the subject
matter of a review.
11. The staff will prepare an analysis and assessment of the performance under
programs supported by use of the Fund's general resources in the credit tranches in
connection with Article IV consultations and as appropriate in connection with further
requests for use of the Fund's resources.
12. The staff will from time to time prepare, for review by the Executive Board, studies of
programs supported by stand-by arrangements in order to evaluate and compare the
appropriateness of the programs, the effectiveness of the policy instruments, and the
observance of the programs, and the results achieved. Such reviews will enable the
Executive Board to determine when it may be appropriate to have the next




Standard deviation 12 12Table 7. Number of Structural Policy Commitments in IMF Programs
with Three Asian Crisis Countries, 1999-2000
Indonesia 10/97 1/98 4/98 6/98 7/98 9/98 10/98 11/98 3/99 5/99 7/99 1/00 7/00
28 31 140 109 96 68 62 74 35 33 29 42 41
South Korea 12/3/97 12/5/97 12/24/97 2/98 5/98 7/98 11/98 3/99 11/99 7/00
29 33 50 53 51 39 53 83 94 68
Thailand 8/97 11/97 2/98 5/98 8/98 12/98 3/99 9/99
26 24 21 73 50 69 8 9 Table 8. Indonesia: Excerpts from Structural Policy Conditions
Policy Action Policy Action
Fiscal Issues
Discontinue budgetary and extrabudgetary support and privileges to IPTN
(Nusantara Aircraft Industry) projects.
Remove VAT exemption arrangements. Conduct revenue review with Fund assistance.
Increase proportion of market value of land and buildings assessable for tax to
40 percent for plantation and forestry. Monetary and banking issues
Introduce single tax payer registration number. Provide autonomy to BI in formulation of monetary and interest rate policy.
Increase non-oil tax revenue by raising annual audit coverage, developing
improved
Publish key monetary data on a weekly basis.
VAT audit programs, and increasing recovery of tax arrears. Submit to Parliament a draft law to institutionalize Bank Indonesia’s autonomy.
Increase in two stages excise taxes on alcohol and tobacco to reflect exchange
rate and price developments.
Submit draft amendment to banking law to Parliament.
Raise profit transfers to the budget from state enterprises, including Pertamina. Provide autonomy to state banks to adjust interest rates on credit and deposit
liabilities, within any guidelines applying to all banks.
Raise prices on rice, sugar, wheat flour, corn, soybeanmeal and fishmeal. Impose limits on and phase out BI credits to public agencies and public sector
enterprises.
Eliminate subsidies on sugar, wheat flour, corn, soybeanmeal and fishmeal. Strengthen BI’s bank supervision department and strengthen enforcement of
regulations.
Accelerate provisions under the Nontax Revenue Law of May 1997, to require
all off-budget funds to be incorporated in budget within three years (instead of
five years).
Upgrade the reporting and monitoring procedures for foreign exchange exposures
of banks.
Incorporate accounts of Investment Fund and Reforestation Fund within
budget.
Appoint high level foreign advisors to BI to assist in the conduct of monetary
policy.
Ensure reforestation funds used exclusively for financing reforestation
programs.
Set minimum capital requirements for banks of Rp 250 billion by end-1998, after
loan loss provisions.
Central Government to bear cost of subsidizing credit to small-scale enterprises
through State banks.
Reduce the minimum capital requirements for existing banks.
Cancel 12 infrastructure projects. Make loan loss provisions fully tax deductible, after tax verification.
Discontinue special tax, customs, or credit privileges granted to the National
Car.
Establish program for divestiture of BI’s interests in private banks.
Phase out local content program for motor vehicles. Require all banks to prepare audited financial statements.
Abolish compulsory 2 percent after-tax contribution to charity foundations.Table 8 (continued)
Policy Action Policy Action
Require banks to publish regularly more data on their operations. Conduct portfolio, systems and financial reviews of all IBRA banks as well as
major non-IBRA banks by internationally recognized audit firms.
Lift restrictions on branching of foreign banks. Conduct portfolio, systems, and financial reviews of all other banks by
internationally recognized audit firms.
Submit to Parliament a draft law to eliminate restrictions on foreign
investments in listed banks and amend bank secrecy with regard to
nonperforming loans.
Announce plan for restructuring state banks through mergers, transfers of assets
and liabilities or recapitalization prior to privatization.
Eliminate all restrictions on bank lending except for prudential reasons or to
support cooperatives or small scale enterprises.
Ensure that state banks sign performance contracts, prepared by the Ministry of
Bank restructuring
Finance with World Bank assistance.
Close 16 nonviable banks. Merge two state-owned banks and conduct portfolio reviews of the two banks.
Replace the closed banks’ management with liquidation teams. Draft legislation enabling state bank privatization.
Compensate small depositors in the 16 banks. Introduce private sector ownership of at least 20 percent in at least one state bank.
Place weak regional development banks under intensive supervision by BI. Prepare state-owned banks for privatization.
Provide liquidity support to banks, subject to increasingly restrictive
conditions.
Develop rules for the Jakarta Clearing House that will transfer settlement risk
from BI to participants.
Provide external guarantee to all depositors and creditors of all locally-
incorporated banks.
Introduce legislation to amend the banking law in order to remove the limit on
private ownership of banks.
Establish Indonesia Bank Restructuring Agency (IBRA). Introduce deposit insurance scheme.
Determine uniform and transparent criteria for transferring weak banks to
IBRA.
Establish Financial Sector Advisory Committee to advise on bank restructuring.
Transfer 54 weak banks to IBRA. Declare insolvency of six private banks intervened in April and write down
shareholder equity.
Transfer claims resulting from past liquidity support from BI to IBRA. Issue government bonds to Bank Negara Indonesia at market-related terms to
finance transfer of deposits of banks frozen in April.
Transfer to IBRA control of seven banks accounting for over 75 percent of past
BI liquidity support and seven banks that have borrowed more than 500
percent of their capital.
Initiate first case of an IBRA bank under the new bankruptcy law.
IBRA will continue to take control of or freeze additional banks that fail to
meet liquidity or solvency criteria. Where necessary, any such action will be
accompanied by measures to protect depositors or creditors in line with the
Government guarantee.
Foreign trade
Issue presidential decree to provide appropriate legal powers to IBRA,
including its asset management unit.
Reduce by 5 percentage points tariffs on items currently subject to tariffs of 15 to
25 percent.
Take action to freeze, merge, recapitalize, or liquidate the six banks for which
audits have already been completed.
Cut tariffs on all food items to a maximum of 5 percent.
Establish independent review committee to enhance transparency and
credibility of
Abolish local content regulations on dairy products.
IBRA operations.Table 8 (continued)
Policy Action Policy Action
Reduce tariffs on nonfood agricultural products by 5 percentage points
Investment and Deregulation
Gradually reduce tariffs on non-food agricultural products to a maximum of Remove the 49 percent limit on foreign investment in listed companies.
10 percentage points. Issue a revised and shortened negative list of activities closed to foreign investors.
Reduce by 5 percentage points tariffs on chemical products. Remove restrictions on foreign investment in palm oil plantations.
Reduce tariffs on steel/metal products by 5 percentage points. Lift restrictions on foreign investment in retail trade.
Reduce tariffs on chemical, steel/metal and fishery products to 5–10 percent. Lift restrictions on foreign investment in wholesale trade.
Abolish import restrictions on all new and used ships. Dissolve restrictive marketing arrangements for cement, paper and plywood.
Phase out remaining quantitative import restrictions and other nontariff
barriers.
Eliminate price controls on cement.
Abolish export taxes on leather, cork, ores and waste aluminum products. Allow cement producers to export with only a general exporters license.
Reduce export taxes on logs, sawn timber, rattan and minerals to a maximum
of
Free traders to buy sell and transfer all commodities across district and provincial
boundaries, including cloves, cashew nuts and vanilla.
30 percent by April 15, 1998; 20 percent by end-December 1998, and 15
percent by end-December 1999 and 10 percent by end-December 2000.
Eliminate BPPC (Clove Marketing Board).
Phase in resource rent taxes on logs, sawn timber, and minerals. Abolish quotas limiting the sale of livestock.
Replace remaining export taxes and levies by resource rent taxes as
appropriate.
Prohibit provincial governments from restricting trade within and between
provinces.
Eliminate all other export restrictions. Enforce prohibition of provincial and local export taxes.
Remove ban on palm oil exports and replace by export tax of 40 percent. The
level of the export tax will be reviewed regularly for possible reduction, based
on market prices and the exchange rate and reduced to 10 percent by end-
December 1999.
Take effective action to allow free competition in:
(i) importation of wheat, wheat flour, soybeans and garlic;
(ii) sale or distribution of flour; and
(iii) importation and marketing of sugar.
Release farmers from requirements for forced planting of sugar cane.Table 9. Number of Structural Benchmarks (SBs) According to



























Average for SBA 13













Average for EFF 23Table 10: Percentage of IMF Loan Actually Disbursed under Each Arrangement,
distribution by quartiles
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Fully Disbursed (4)+(5) Number of 
All Arrangements x<0.25 0.25=<x<0.50 0.50=<x<0.75 0.75=<<1.0 (x=1.0) 0.75=<x Arrangements
1973-77 36.5 7.1 5.9 5.9 44.7 50.6 85
1978-82 19.4 16.1 10.5 12.9 41.1 54.0 124
1983-87 12.9 15.8 19.4 7.9 43.9 51.8 139
1988-92 17.5 15.1 20.6 14.3 32.5 46.8 126
1993-97 27.0 19.1 26.2 11.3 16.3 27.6 141
Full period (1973-97) 21.6 15.3 17.6 10.7 34.8 45.5 615
of which
Stand-By 23.1 13.4 15.0 9.5 39.0 48.5 441
EFF 33.3 22.2 19.0 15.9 9.5 25.4 63
SAF/ESAF 9.0 18.9 27.0 12.6 32.4 45.0 111
Source: IMF, Transactions of the Fund (1998)Table 11. Asian Crisis Countries: Real GDP, 
Consumer Prices, and Current Account Balance
Real GDP Consumer Prices Current Account Balances
(annual % change) (annual % change) (as % of GDP)
Indonesia 1998 -13.0 58.0 4.2
1999 0.3 20.8 3.7
2000* 4.8 3.8 2.0
2001* 3.0 7.1 3.3
Korea 1998 -6.7 7.5 12.8
1999 10.7 0.8 6.1
2000* 8.8 2.3 2.4
2001* 3.8 3.6 1.2
Thailand 1998 -10.2 8.1 12.7
1999 4.2 0.3 9.1
2000* 4.3 1.5 7.2
2001* 2.5 1.5 8.4
* Estimated
Sources: 1998 and 1999, IMF [2000]; 2000 and 2001, Spencer [2001]Table 12. Financial Restructuring in Asian Crisis Countries
Indonesia  Korea Thailand
1. Initial liquidity support to banks $21.7 billion $23.3 billion $24.1 billion
(18% of GDP) (5% of GDP) (20% of GDP)
2. Bank shutdowns 70 of 237 None 1 of 15
3. Shutdowns of non-bank financial institutions  None > 200 59 of 91
4. Mergers of finacial institutions 4 of 7 state banks
merged, and 9 banks
nationalized
9 of 26 taken over by
other banks
3 banks and 12 finance
companies merged
5. Banks nationalized (temporarily) 4 4 4
6. Government provided funds for recapitalizations Sovereign bonds
equivalent to $67.8
billion issued
$50 billion injected into
9 commercial banks; 3
out of 5 major banks
now at least 80%
controlled by state 1




7. Majority overseas ownership of banks  Allowed, 1 potentially Allowed, 1 completed








A few weak private
commercial and public
banks
9. a- Nonperforming loans / total loans 58.8% (Nov/00) 17.9% (Sept/00) 26.5% (Dec/00)
b- Nonperforming loans / total loans after
transfers to asset management companies 23.9% (Nov/00) 12.3% (Sept/00) 17.7% (Dec/00)
10. Assets disposed of as a share of assets
transferred to Asset Management Companies
(AMCs)
7.0% 48.0% 70 % of the assets of
closed finance
companies
11. Corporate governance + management of banks 
(a) independent outside directors None 2/3 of board slots 19
(b) changes in top management, majority owned
domestic banks None 6 of 11 major banks 3 of 11 banks
12.  Corporate restructuring (August, 1999)
(a) out-of-court restructured debt/total debt
(percent)
13 40 22
(b) in-court restructured debt/total debt (percent) 4 8 7
13. Interest difficulties of firms. Percent that cannot
cover interest expense from operational cash
flows 2000-02 (assuming 1999 interest rates)
53 17 22
14. Public debt, percent of GDP
(a) 1997 48 11 7
(b) 1999 98 37 40
15. Quality of financial sector regulation index:
(4=best practice, 1=weakest)
(a) 1997 1.3 2.7 1.0
(b) 1999 2.0 3.0 2.7
16. Ownership concentration + legal framework
(a) Percent, ownership of top 15 families 62 38 53
(b) Efficiency of judicial system, index (1=worst,
10=best)
2.5 6.0 3.2
(c) Rule of law, index (1=worst, 10=best) 4.0 5.4 6.3
(d) Corruption, index (1=worst, 10=top) 2.2 5.3 5.2
17. Market structure changes in financial sector (1999) 2
(a) Number of commercial banks: taken
over/sold to foreigners/nationalized
4/0/4 9/1/4 3/4/2004
(b) Number of private domestic banks (market
share %)
122(21) 18(37) 13(48)
(c) Number of state banks (market share, %)  43(78) 10(58) 6(45)
(d) Number of non banks (market share, %) 245(1) 11(5) 22(7)
Sources: Claessens et al [1999], World Bank [2000], and national sources
1 In December 2000, an additional $36 billion was made available for banks/ non-banks financial intermediaries
2 Share of assets held by foreign banks (mid 2000) was 12% for Indonesia; 8% for Korea; and 16% for ThailandFigure 2. The Coverage of Structural Conditionality in Stand-By and Extended Arrangments 





















































sFigure 3. Distribution of Structural Conditions in Fund-
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